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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
DON HALVERSON,
Plaintiff / Appellant,
and
CHARLOTTE HALVERSON
Plaintiff
VS.

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
FOR THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their official
capacities and in their individual capacities; DAN
PAYNE, in his official capacity and in his
individual capacity,
Defendants / Respondents.

Appealed from the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Latah
HON. JOHN R. STEGNER, DISTRICT JUDGE

DON HALVORSON
PRO SE
RONALD J. LANDECK
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS

Filed this

,2009

day of

STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK

BY

--

Deputy

SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 36825-2009
VOLUME VII OF VII VOLUMES
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Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Haivorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. C\/ 2008-180
Plaintiffs

vs.

)

PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH RECORD

)

SUPPLEMENT

North hatah County Highway District; Board of )
Commissioners for the North Latah County

)

Highway District, Orfand Arneberg, Richard

)

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

}

Individual Capacity

)

i

Defendants
ST.4TE OF ID-4HO )
1%.

Coulztj of Latah

>

Don HaI\.orson and Charlotte Halvorson depose a113 s a :~
1 . MTeare the Plaintiffs nailed in the above case and hzreby sttbniit Plaintilfs' Fourth

Record Supplement

PLAIKTIFFS FOUR'TH RECORD SLPPLE'14ENT
1

2. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and conect copy
of Land Patent Details-BLh4

GLO Records @

http: ,'i~i-zw.glorecords.blm.gos ' P a t e n t S e a r c k ' D e t a i l . a s p ? P a t e n t D o c e ! a s c
cession=l 1 18993&1ndex=I &Qr) ID=38950.94&DetailTab-1. Land Patent Details, for
Douglas R. Kelfj : and

http:i1~~u~;v.glorecords.bl~nngos~~PatentSearch'Image.asp?PatentDocCIassCode=SER&.~c
cession= 1 1 18993&Format=PDF&Page=i &fndex=l &QryID=3 92363'02E82, Document
Image. for Douglas R. Kelly referenced as Item No. 1.
3. Attached hereto with reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct copy
of Land Patent Details-BLM

GLO Records (3

htlp:l/s\~w
.glorecords.blm.go\.iPatentSe~ck'Detai1.a~p?PatentDocC1assCode=SER&~4c
eession=IDIDAAt-02033O&Index=3 &Qr! ID=3 98?5.84&DetailTab= 1, Land Patent
Details. for Emmett J. Geminill: and
http://\h7'iw.glorecords.blm.go\ P a t e n t S e a r c h ~ D e t a i l . a s p ? P a t e ~ ~ t D o c C l a s s C c

cession=iDID~4,4-02033O&Ii~de~=3~QryID=39825~~02E84&DetailTab=2.
Legal Land
Descriutiori. for Emmett J. GenimilI re-ferenced as Itein No. 3.
4. ?Lttached hereto with reference to the correspondi~~g
number is a true and coixct cop)
of photograph (all talten in 2006. utlless others\ise rioted) and,'or map referenced as Item
No. 3:
(a) p. +1, of "Rierson" fence along Little Bear Ridge Road: YLGEID jtlrisdiction.
silowing buried fence by road maintenance;
(b) p. r 2 of aerial ~ i e nof section 15; FSA files circa 1989:

ic) p. $3 of Plaintiffs' fence on Canlps Ca~iyonRoad:
(d) p. +4 \ ieu looking nor-tl-tt%estof 3 J - acre parcel shorn i ~ i glJ7agner"post" at
grass) dram ("C"). '.hardened area"
edge of the road (".4"). east propert) line ('-B"),
\\liere seaso~ialcreek crossed the road ("D" ). and (*'E") approximate original intersection
of east propert) line u ~ t the
h old Caiiips Can!

PLA41NTIFFSFOURTH RECORD SUPPLER.IENT

'7

011 Road.

prior to 1996:

(e i p. f;5 Plaintiffs' corral kvith s~ppoi-tfence of wire fence sho.i?-ir~,o
ileM drainage
ditch ("B) and old compaction roller pushed into fence knockiilg off of top rail ("A"):

if)
p. P6 Plaintiffs' 5-\?.ire fence at narrowest spot of the "buffer". edge of road
and supporting structures when fence was rebuilt in 1997 (--B"). and bottom 2 wires
co\.ered with dirt and gravel in sunllner of 9006;
(g) p. $7 showing scaning and erosion of Plaintiffs property after Wagners pulled
the rocks off after the Rixnrock surveq showed the dri\;eway access to be \vholly o
Plaintiffs land;

(h) p. $8 Plaintiffs fence (looking west) is buried b) snou p l o ~pushing snom into
fence:

(i) p. $9 Plaintiffs fence is buried b j snom7pi014 pushins snon into fence;
Cjj p. #10 Spring thaw 2008 sho~vingdamage to fence and gravel on top of

melting snou shobving horn far of in excess Defendants puslied snow:
(k) p. $1 I same area as $8 looking east sliowing distance of travelled road surface.
"tire tracks" and Plaintiffs' fence:

(1) p. h12 looking due west shot?-ing3 4 - acre parcel shaming south propert: line

("-C').
east property ("B").old farm line before Rimrock survey ("CC").and '.hardened
area where seasonal creek crossed the road:
(m) p. PI 3 loolcing due west sl-tokxing so~rthpropertj line ("A"). east propert:
("19"). \r\'agrzer sun e j "post" ('-C"). and "fiardened area x i here seasolla1 creel\ crossed thc

road:
(11) p. + I 4

looking nor-tlnwesr from Camps Canyon Road sho~vinggrassy d r a ~

(.'A"i. old pine trees ("B"),approximate path of old road. prior to 1396:
(o) p.

+ 15 3007 F S A aerial photo tvith propert) lines and farm field lines:

(p) p. 41 6 looking north%est. approximate line of old fence and exca-raxed trees

and distance fence is off the road (approxiutlate vieu of W ) :
(q) p. ~ 1 looking
7
south at 8 foot hadl left by moving road base ro the northeast

in 1996;

PLA4irii\;TIFFSFCit7RTH RECORD Si-PPLEMENT
l
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a

1362

(r) p. f:18 Metsker Map circa early 1950's -'TOWSKIP 39 N.. 3 M;.B.%/l."
(s) p # I 9 Standard Atlas of Latall Coimt~. Geo. A. Ogle Bi Co. Chicago 1914.
showing TOU'NSI-IIP 39s.. Range 3 U'.. sl~o\%in$
extent of .riagon trails throush Camps
Can! on:
(t) p. F 20 looking south along east propert3 line after XLCHD excax ated the
remains of the 8 foot bank. showing road parailelin east property line and 84 i i - feet
loss of road frontage;
(u) p. 82 1 Latah County Road Plat Book showing Camps Canyon Road not
crossing section 15. that it was not recorded:
(v) p. $22 photo showing congruence of Rimrock survey lvith original fence line:

old barb wire fence embedded into old tree stump I00 years old ("A"), and stake marking
mest line of SE :iNE % (-'B").
5. Attached hereto xith reference to the corresponding number is a true and correct cop!
of Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs' First Request For Admissions (Payne)
referenced as Item No. 4.

6. Attached hereto \\ith reference to the corresponding number is a true and cossect copy
of Defendants' Responses To Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Payne) referenced as Itern
KO. 5.
Dated this 17"' day of Februasy. 2009.

SI'BSCRIBED ,4SD St;l-ORX TO b

Don Halvorson
e this 1 7thday of Februar~. 3009.

34) coilninission expires:
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"

The subsequent inquiry is whether defendants' actions interfered with plaintiffs'
use and enjoyment of their land to a degree that implicates substantive due
process. In United Artists n e a t r e Circuit v. Fflarrington, 3 16 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.
2003), the third circuit held that in order to challenge a municipal land-use
decision as a violation of substantive due process plaintiffs must show that the
defendants' conduct "shocks the conscience." Id. at 400 (relying on standard set
in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d
1043 (1998)). The court noted that "[lland use decisions are matters of local
concern, and such disputes should not be transformed into substantive due
process claims based only on allegations that government officials acted with
improper motives."' Id. at 402. In fact, only "conduct intended to injure in some
way unjustifiable by any government interest" is the kind of action most likely to
be deemed "conscience shocking." County ofSacramento, 523 U.S. 833,849,
118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998).
Aardvark, supra at 444-445.
The Idaho Supreme court further explained the state court's role in resolving substantive
due process claims as follows:
To determine whether an individual's due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment have been violated, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. It
must first decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendnnent." Schevers v. State, 129
Idaho 573, 575, 930 P.2d 603, 605 (1996) (citing Smith v. Me?-idianJoint Sch.
Dist. No. 2., 128 Idaho 714, 722,918 P.2d 583,591 (1996)); see also, True v.
Dep 't ofHealth and WeEfare, 103 Idaho 151,645 P.2d 891 (1982) (citing Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,95 S.Ct. 729,42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)). Only after a court
finds a liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of analysis, in which
it determines what process is due. Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 575,930
P.2d 603,605.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "[tlhe requirements of procedural
due process apply only to the deprivation of interest encompassed by the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board ofRegents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,569,92 S.Ct. 2701,2705,33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
Accordingly, the existence of [a party's] right to due process protections
regarding her request to participate in the.. .depends on whether [the party's]
interest.. .is within the scope of the liberty or property language of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The United States Supreme court has noted that property interests are
"created.. .by existing rules,. ..such as state law." Id. Likewise, this Court has
indicated that "determination of whether a particular right or pri~<Iegeis a
property interest is a matter of state law." Fergtcson v. Bd. of Tmstees of Bonner
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Cty. Sch., 98 Idaho 359, 564 P.2d 971,975 (1977) (citing Bishop v. Food, 426
U.S. 341,96 S.Ct. 2074,48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)). Further determining the
existence of a liberty or property interest depends on the "construction of the
relevant statutes," and the "nature of the interest at stake." True, 103 Idaho at
154, 645 P.2d 891 (citing Tt-ibe, American Constitutional Law, 8 10-9, at 515-16
(1978)). Hence, whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an
examination of the particular statute or ordinance in question. Bishop, U.S. 341,
96 S.Ct. 2074.
Applying these standards to Defendants' motions for summaryjudgment, because the
facts on this record demonstrate that the District has acted within its lawful statutory authority, as
construed by Idaho courts throughout the State's history, in the management of Camps Canyon
Road for the public, Defendants' actions have not "interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment
of their land" to any degree much less "to a degree that implicates substantive due process" or
"shocks the conscience." Aardvark, supra at 445
Plaintiffs repeatedly make unfounded assertions such as "Defendants actions/failures to
act.. .bear no relationship to the public.. .safety.. .or general welfare," which sums up Plaintiffs'
myopic and out-of-touch view of what a "public" road is all about. E.g., see Plaintiffs7
Answering Brief, p. 11. However, Plaintiffs have failed to assert any facts that indicate
Defendants' actions were not justified by a governmental interest.
The United States Supreme court has long viewed with disfavor such "bare allegations of
malice" and has held, under such circumstances, that
governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565,98 S.Ct. 855, 861,
55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S., at 322, 95 S.Ct., at 1001.
War-low v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,817-818, 102 S.Ct. 2727,2738 (1982). The Harlow Court
adopted a test designed to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution
of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment, that focuses on the "objective legal
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reasonableness of an official's conduct" in determining whether the official "could be expected
to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights." Id. at 2738 - 2739.
The Court also opined that "where an official's duties legitimately require action in
which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by
action taken 'with independence and without fear of consequences."' Id. at 2739 [citation
omitted]. This dochine applies directly to the circumstances of the instant case and this qualified

immunity protects the individual Defendants in their performance of discretionary functions
from civil damages and provides independent authority for the dismissal of all claims against
individual Defendants, who, the record aptly demonstrates, acted in accordance with applicable
law as known to them at the time of such actions. In addition, Plaintiffs have failed to establish
as a threshold matter in the proof a due process violation that the individual Defendants' alleged

arbitrary action "can properly be characterized as conscience-shocking in a constitutional sense."
United Artists, supra at 399, citing Collins v. fir-ker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128, 112 S.Ct. 1061

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a New York land use case that dealt with
similar snow plowing and road widening issues, reached the following decision and made the
following observations:
To establish a substantive due process violation, the [plaintiffs] must show that
the Town's alleged acts against their land were "arbitrary," conscienceshocking," or "oppressive in the constitutional sense," not merely "inconect or
ill-advised." Lowrance v. C.O.S. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529,537 (2d Cir. 1994)

...

...although the snow plowing and pax~ingmay have been incorrect or ill-advised,
such actions on the part of the Town were not so outrageous and arbitrary as to
implicate the [Plaintiffs'] substantive due process rights. Rather, they
constituted, at most, occasional unlawful encroachments on the "Reserved for
Parking" parcel necessitated by the Town's performance of its municipal duties.
An y dispute regarding such actions is best resolved in state court. Zahra v.
Town of SoutJzozoEd, 48 F.3d 674,680 (2d Cir.1995) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause
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does not function as a general overseer of the arbitrariness in state and local landuse decisions; in our federal system, that is the province of the state courts.").
Ferran v. Town ofl\iassau, 471 F.3d 363,369-370 (2006).
Likewise, Defendants' conduct was not "conscience-shocking" in the least. While the
driveway permit may, arguably have been issued in error, that act alone fails to rise to the level
of arbitrariness or oppressiveness that is required for a substantive due process violation under tj
1982. Plaintiffs have failed to meet the required legal tests to establish such a violation, and their
substantive due process claims must be dismissed.

2. Procedural Due Process Claims.
Plaintiffs make a variety of assertions regarding alleged violations of their procedural due
process rights and primarily in connection with being allegedly deprived of notice and the right
to be heard prior to the District's undertaking any improvement activity on Camps Canyon Road
or issuing any access permit. This issue had been addressed previously in Defendants' Brief,
however, the additional analysis set forth above in this Reply Brief applies in that Plaintiffs have
not established a claim to a constitutionally or statutorily protected property interest applying
state law principles. Therefore, these claims also fail.
Plaintiffs rely on Homestead Farms v. Board of Commissioner-s reton County, State of
Icfuho, 141 Idaho 855, 119 P.3d 630 (2005) for the proposition that an evidentiary hearing is
required to establish a public highway, however, such reliance is entirely misplaced. Homestead
Farms holds that county commissioners (and, by implication, highway district commissioners)
cannot, by adopting an official map of a public highway system under Idaho Code 40-202,
create public hiaways. The Homestead Farms Court holds that in order for a highway to be
included on the official map of the highway district's system, that highway must have been a
public highx~ayprior to adoption of the map. In this case, the Third Affidavit of the District's
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Clerk, Dan Casscallen, contains the District's records of its official map process and an official
map of the District's public highway system was undertaken and adopted in accordance with law
and proof was presented at a public hearing following due notice that each highway described on
the District's official map qualified as a public highway independently of its inclusion on the
map. Thrd Affidavit of Dan Carscallen filed February 13,2009.

h addition, Title 40, Idaho Code and related statutes provide adequate procedural due
process and afford "a full judicial mechanism" under which the District's administrative
decisions can be challenged. See Robirz v. Rerzsalenz Township, 616 F.2d 680 f3T" Cir. 1980).
The District has not made any administrative decisions or failed to take any administrative action
in violation of Idaho law, and Plaintiffs have not set forth any admissible facts or supporting

legal authority to the contrary.
3. Equal Protection Clainis.
Piaintiffs have sprinkled their Complaint and other writings with vague assertions that the
District has violated their rights to equal protection of the law. These averments have been made
without any offer of evidence that Plaintiffs have been "singled out" by the District for
discriminatory treatment. The evidence on this record is to the contrary in that the District
officials testify that their road improvement policies are applied uniformly and, in fact, that this
is the only lawsuit in institutional memory in which taking and due process claims have been
made against the District. Plaintiffs have not produced any particularized evidence to support
any equal protection claim and any such claims must fail and be dismissed. See Aardvark, supra

B. Constitutional Claims Against the District.
Under Monell v. Dept. of Social Sew., 436 U.S. 658,98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d
611 (19781, a municipality may be found liable for violating an individual's civil
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rights under limited circumstances. Tn order to prevail on such a claim, a
plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) the deprivation of a constitutional right; 2) that
action was taken pursuant to a custom or policy of the local government unit; and
3) that sucll action was the cause of the deprivation. Id.
As discussed above in connection with Plaintiffs' substantive due process claims against
individual Defendants, Plaintiffs have not established that they were deprived of any of their
constitutional rights or that any policy of the District exists that is responsible for depriving
Plaintiffs of any of their constitutional rights. Without the establishment of any such deprivation
or identification of any such infirm policy, Plaintiffs' due process claims against the District fail.
Further, there being no reasonable basis upon which to "expand the due process concepts
of,, .property under the Idaho Constitution beyond the contemplation of the Fourteenth
Amendment," such claims also fail under Article I, Section 15 of the Idaho Constitution.

Maresh, supra at 227, P.2d at 20.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully request Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted as
to all Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants in this action.
Dated this 26th day of February, 2009.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
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Ronaw J. Landeck
A d e y s for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual Inthe manner indicated below:

[ XJU.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ IFAX
[ 1 Hand Delivery

DON Z-IALVORSON
CWARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, DAHO 8353 7
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RoIiBld J. Landeck
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RONALD 3. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LAA'DECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendafits

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NORTH LATAH COmTTYHIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
WANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PATY'KE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,

)
) Case No. CV 2008-1 80
)
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
) EXPEDITED HEARING

1
1
1
)

1
)
)
)

1
)

Defendants.
Defendants, through counsel, move this Court under Rule 7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. for an order to
expedite the hearing of Defendant's Second Motion to Strike and Defendants' Motion To Enlarge
Time each filed herewith on February 24,2009, such that said motions will be heard at 9:OO a.m. on
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Tuesday, March 3,2009, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be called by the Court in the
designated courtroom at the Nez Perce County Courthouse.
As grounds for this motion, Defendants rely upon Defendants' Second Motion to Strike and
Defendants' Motion to Enlarge Time.
Defendants request oral argument upon this motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of February, 2009.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
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IN T I E DISTRICT CBbXT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, I
N AND FOR THE COLTNTY OF LATa4H
COURT MINUTES
Presiding Judge
CARL, B. KERRICK
Reporter
NANCY TOtVLER
Date MARCH 3,2009
-.
lime: 9:00 a.m.
DON &: CHARLOTTE flALVORSBN
(Eusband and Wife),

1

Plaintiffs,

1

)

1

Docket No. CV-2008-180

/

1
1
1
1

VS.

NORTH LATA4HCOUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
)
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH
EATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT )
ORLAND ARNEGERG, RICHARD
)
HL4NSEN,S H E M A N CLYDE, in their
)
Official Capacites, and in their Individuai
Capacities; DAN PAYXE: in his official
1
capacity and in his individual capacity,
t
t
Defendants.
1

APPEARAKCES:
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
DON HALVORSON
For, Plaintiff
RONALD LANDECIC
For, Defendant

1

SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: PENDING MOTIONS

RE IT KNOlW, THAT THE FOLLOWhTGPROCEEDmiiGS WERE HAD, TO-WIT:
COURTROOL% #1
90047 Don and Charlotte Halvorson present.
Ronald Landeck present with Dan CarscaBin.
Court reviews pending motions. Plaintiff has a motion for partial summar) judgment.
Defendant has a motion for enlargement of time, motion for summar! judgment, and
motions to strike.
90150 Mr. Landeck presents argument re: motion for enlargement of time.
1
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COURT h4INUTES MARCH 3,2009

CV-2008-180

;HALVBRSON VS. NORTH LATAM CO. HWL;

90300 Mr. Halvorson presents argument re: motion for enlargement of time.
90440 Court grants motion to enlarge time.
90537 Mr. Halvorson presents argument on motion for partial summary judgment.
9301 8 Mr. Eandeck presents a~gumentre: all pending motions.
102623 Mr. Halvorson presents further argument.
103640 Mr. Landeck presents further argument.
103905 Court takes matter under advisement and will issue a written decision.
103930 Recess 10:15 a.m.

Deputy Clerk
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
N .AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO, I

1
1

DON & CHARLOTTE WALVERSON,
Husband and Wife,

1
1

Plaintiff,

)

VS.

1
NORTH LATAH CObTLTTYHIGHWAY
DISTRTCT: BOARD OF COMMISSIOXERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAI2 COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT ORLL4R'D,4RSLTEGERG,RICHARD
WANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their Official
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;
DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and in his
Individual capacity,
Defendant.

CASE 3 0 . CV08-00180
ORDER VACATING PRETRIAL
AKD JURY TRIAL

)
)
)
)
)

1
)

1
)

The Court previously scheduled this matter for a pretrial conference to be held on
April 13: 2009 and a j q -trial to be Ixeld beginning April 20,2009. On March 3, 2009 the parties
argued several motions which are still pending before the Cour-t. Subsequent to the motions being

ORDER VACATING PRETRIAL
AND JGRY TRIAL

1

heard on March 3: 2009, the Court presided over a medical malpractice jury trial which lasted four
weeks in length. As a consequence, the Court has been unable to devote the necessary time to
decide the motions pending before the Court in this case.
THEREFORE, the pretrial conference scheduled to be held on April 13,2009 and the
jury trial to be held beginning April 20, 2009 are hereby VACATED.

Once the motions currently pending before the Court have been decided, a scheduling
conference will be placed on the Court's calendar.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6"l day of April, 2009.

CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge

ORDER VACATING PRETRIAL
AND JURY TRIAL

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of
the foregoino
ER VACATING PRETRIAL AND JURY TRIAL
P&%
was mailed, po3age pre aid, by the undersigned at
Lewiston, Idaho, this b
day of
April, 2009, to:

Pk

-k

Don Walvorson
Charlotte Halvorson
1290 America Ridge Road
Kendrick ID 83537
Ronald J. Landeck
P O Box 9344
Moscow ID 83843
Clerk of the Cowt
P O Box 8068
iMoscoui ID 83843
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

1

DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

)

1
1

Plaintiffs,

)

CASE NO. CV 2008-00 180
V.

1

OBI8ION ,LIT)BRDEW ON PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGWIENT AND DEFENDL4NTS'
MOTION FOR SUAMM,4RYJUDGMENT

NORTH LATAH COII'NTY HIGHWAY )
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
)
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH
)
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT,)
1
ORLANI) ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their
)
official capacities, and their individual
1
capacities: DAN PAYNE, in his official
)
capacity and in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

1
)

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
and Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009 and the Defendants' Motion for Summary

OPPJION . U D ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS
FOR PARTIAL SUIvIbIARY JUDGMENT AiUD
DEFEYDANTS' hlIOTION FOR SUMMARY JLDGMENT

1

~udgment.' The Court h e a d oral argument on March 3,2009. The Plaintiffs elected to proceed
pro se in the matters. The Defendants were represented by Ronald Landeck. attorney at law. The

Court. having heard argument and being hlly advised in these matters; hereby renders its
decision.

BACKGROUND
The Complaint in this matter was filed on March 3, 2008. Issues in the case surround
improvements made to a road which traverses a portion of the Plaintiffs' property, Camps
Canyon ~ o a d . *This road is located in rural Latah County, Idaho, and is maintained by the
Defendants, North Latah Highway District (hereinafter "Highway District").
The Plaintiffs argue that any "increase in width or use, or change in location or nature
(type) of the public right-of-waylpublic highway" where Camps Canyon Road traverses the
Plaintiffs property may be a deprivati~nof the Plaintiffs' constit.~tionallyprotected property
rights. Complaint, at 7. Further, the Plaintiffs allege that the Highway District's modifications
and maintenance of Camps Canyon Road resulted in the taking of Plaintiffs' property. The
Plaintiffs also allege the Defendants have violated their due process rights by failing to provide
notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding issues surrounding various decisions the
Highway District has made while maintaining Camps Canyon Road.
Procedurally, the Plaintiffs have filed se-teral motions which this Court has addressed.
First, the Plaintiffs filed two motions for declaratory judgment. which were denied because one

'

Defendants have also filed a motion to strlke portions of the Plamtiffs' Affidavit filed January 26, 2009 The Court
did not take argument on the matter The Court relies only on relevant facts. admiss~bleas evidence, ur support of
the motlons for summary jud-ment.
2
Additional background of the case is found within the Opznzon and Order on PlazrztrfSss'illlotzonfor Declaratoiy
Judgment of I C § 40-203,3 and Plazntzfs ' Motzon for Declaratory Judgment under I C § 67-8003j3)
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DEFENDANTS ' ,\jlOTIOh' FOR SLrIvIMARY JCDGiMENT

3

motion sought an advisory opinion beyond the purview of Idaho's Declaratory Judgment AC?
and this Court found, for purposes of judicial economy, these matters were best addressed
through the underlying civil litigation.
Following the motions for declaratory judgment, the Plaintiffs filed three motions for
summary judgment. These motions were denied because the Court found that questions of
material fact remained which could not be resolved based upon the motions then before the
Court. Further, the Plaintiffs presented novel theories of law which the Court found were
unsupported.
Currently before this Court are both parties' motions for summary judgment. The
Plaintiffs' brief seeks summary judgment on several issues, in addition to requests for
reconsideration of this Court's previous rulings, and other various motions. The Defendants are
seeking siimrnxy judgment as to a11 the claims in the Plai~tiffs*
Complaini.

SUMitIARY WDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. the court must construe the pleadings,
depositions. admissions, and affidavits in a light most favorable to the nonmoving parp.

Conwliy v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146. 106 P.3d 470' 472 (2005), citing Infinger v. Cily of
Salmon, 137 Ida110 45,44 P.3d 1 I00 (2002).
When a motion for summary judgment is *'supported by a particularized affidavit. the
opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but must set forth
56(e); Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co..
"speciiic facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P.
-

---

' S e e IVoh v Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798. 53 P.3d 1217 (2002).
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107 Idaho 335, 337, 689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). Akmere scintilla" of evidence or only a "slight doubt" as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corhridge v Clark
Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87,730 P.2d 1005. 1007 (1986), citing Snake River Equip. Co v.
Christensen, 107 Idaho 54 1, 69 1 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Jenkins v Boise Cascade
Corp., 141 Idaho 233,238, 108 P.3d 380,385 (2005). Finally, the initial burden of establishing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party, and once this burden is
met. it is incumbent upon the nonmoving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that
element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 41 6 (1 996).

ANALYSIS
Several issues are before this Court on summary judgment, with voluminous briefing
filed in the matter. Due to the lengthy nature of the briefing presented to this Court, the issues
will not be presented in the order of the parties' briefs. The Court will first address the issue
which is the crux of this lawsuit, the fact that the roadway in question is a public highway
established by public use. Based upon this uncontroverted fact. the width of Camps Canyon
Road. as a public highway, can be determined based upon statutory authority. The remaining
claims made by the Plaintiffs are resolved accordingly based upon the status of Camps Canyon
Road.
For organizational purposes, this Opinion is divided into three sections. First this Court
addresses claims associated with the status of the roadway. Second, Plaintiffs' claims of due
process ~iolationswill be addressed, and finally, all remaining claims are considered.
A, Claims associated with the status of the roadway.
1, Camps Canyon Road is a public highway established through public use.
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Both parties to this lawsuit agree that Camps Canyon Road has been established as a
public highway through public use. The Plaintiffs have concurred that the road is a public
highway established by prescription within the Plaintiffs' current motion for summary judgment."
Further, in reliance of the fact that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway established through
public use, the Plaintiffs also previously brought a motion for summary judgment through the
presentation of a novel theory that improvements made to Camps Canyon Road nullified the
width of the original right of way5 See Plainti$. ' Motioizfor Summary Judwent dated

September 19, 2008. In addition, the Plaintiffs confirmed their agreement that Camps Canyon
Road existed as a public highway by prescription in a responsive brief filed earlier in these
proceedings:
Further, Plaintiffs do not dispute Camps Canyon Road was at some time used for
a period of five years which may have coincided with being worked and kept up at
the public expense. If as an element of the specific issue to be adjudicated and for
this motion only. Plaintiffs do not dispute Cainps Canyon Road existed as an
unrecorded prescriptive road/highway/right of way, as is where is until the
alterations in 1996.

Plaintgs ' Reply Briefto Defendants' Answering Briefto Plaintgs ' 12.;fotionforPartial Summary
.Jz~dgment,filed November 10,2008. at 4.
The Defendants have submitted affidavits of facts which support the determination that
Camps Canyon Road is a public highway established through public use. See AJ$~;iavitof Orland

'See Plai12tijfi'Motionfor Partial Sun-zmaiy Judgments and Other iMotions Submitted January 26, 2009, and BrieJ
at 29-3 1.
The Plaintiffs set forth a novel argument that the original right-of-way was nullified based upon alterations made by
the Highway District in 1996. The Plaintiffs relied on District of Colunzbia v. Robinson, 180 U.S. 92, 21 S.Ct. 283,
45 L.Ed. 440 (1901) in support of this theory. However, the facts of District of Colzcmbia v. Robinson can be
distinguished from the case at hand because the easement addressed in that case was of smaller proportion:
specifically, the easement was limited to the width of the roadway surface. Id. at 108-09,21 S.Ct, at 289. Nothing
within the case supports the Plaintiffs' argument that the width of Camps Canyon Road is limited to the surface of
the roadway. Further; nothing within District of Columbia v. Robinson supports the Plaintiffs' novel theory of
nullification of the width of the original right of way.
5
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Ameberg in Opposition to Plaint$s

Motions for Partial Summary Jz~dgmentFiled September

19, October 6 and October 21, 2008; see also Affidavit of Dan Carscallen in Opposition to
Plaintgs ' iwotionsfor Partial Summary Jzidgment Filed September 19, October 6 and October
21, 2008. In addition, the road is listed as a public highway under the jurisdiction of the
Highway District on the official map of the Highway District, adopted in 1986. AfJ;davit of Dan
Carscallen in Opposition to Plaintij5' c;'Wotionsfor Partial Summary Judgment filed September
19, October 6, and October 21, 2008.
The Plaintiffs do not refute the fact that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway
established through public use, as established in the aforementioned affidavits. When a motion
for summary judgment is "supported by a particularized affidavit; the opposing party may not
rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but must set forth "specific facts" showing
a genuine issue. 1.PLC.P. 56(e); Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance C3., 107 Idaho 335, 337: 589
P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). A "mere scintilla" of evidence or only a '-slight doubt" as to the
facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co.. 112
Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1 0 0 5 1007 (1986).~
The Idaho Supreme Court recently discussed the requirements for determining whether a
public highway exists in Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145
Idaho 360. 179 P.3d 323. (2008).

6

Within the Plalntrfls' ilfidavzt in Support ofPlaivlt@' ibfotionfor Partial Summaiy Judgment and Other ,l.fotlons
Submitted Janz~ar?,26, 2009, the Plaintiffs aver that the movement of the roadbed of Camps Canyon Road vanes
6om just a fe- feet to more than fi@ feet depending on where it is measured and how it is measured. The Court
fmds this assertion to be a bare allegation. unsupported by evidence, and further that the statement is not spec~ficto
the portion of the roadway in question. Because a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is
Insufficient to withstand summary judgment, the Court fmds there is no question of material fact regarding the status
of Camps Canyon Road as a public highway established by public use.
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The requirements for determining whether a public highway exists are set forth
in I.C. tj 40-202. According to the statute, a public road may be acquired: (1) if the
public uses the road for a period of five years. and (2) the road is worked and kept
up at the expense of the public. I.C. 5 40-202(3); Floyd tJ.Bd. of Cornm'rs, 137
Idaho 7 18, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002). The highway district has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that public rights were established.
See Floyd, 137 Idaho at 724, 52 P.3d at 869.
Public status of the roadway can be established by proof of regular
maintenance and extensive public use. Id. There is no intent requirement to create
a public road pursuant to 1.C. 9 40-202(3). la'. at 727, 52 P.3d at 872. "[Tlhe
primary factual questions are the frequency, nature and quality of the public's use
and maintenance." Id. The public must use the road regularly, and the use must be
more than only casual or desultory. Burrup, 1 14 Idaho at 53, 753 P.2d at 264.
Maintenance need only be work and repairs that are reasonably necessary; it is
not necessary maintenance be performed in each of the five consecutive years or
through the entire length of the road. Floyd, 137 Idaho at 724, 52 P.3d at 869
(ciring Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9. 16, 784 P.2d 339, 346 (Ct.App.1989); State
v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho l , 6 , 3 10 P.2d 787, 790 (1957), overruled on other grounds by
French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950,751 P.2d 98 (1988)).
Id. at 365-66, 179 P.3d 328-29.

The record before this Court establishes that the public has -used the road for more than
five years, and that the Highway Department has worked and maintained the road at the expense
of the public. In addition, the Plaintiffs do not rehte that the Camps Canyon Road is a public
highway. Therefore, it is established that the Camps Canyon Road is a public highway,
established by public use. Based upon the status of Camps Canyon Road as a public highway
established by public use, the Court can address the remaining issues within the parties' sunlmary
judgment motions.
2. Public highways in Idaho shall not be less than fifty feet wide, including the
highway in question, Camps Canyon Road.
Certain statutes in Idaho set forth requirements which apply to public highways.
Pertinent to this case is I.C. tj 40-23 12, which establishes that the minimum width of a public
highway in Idaho is fifty feet.
OPINION &VD ORDER ON PLAmTIFFS' MOTIONS
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All highways, except bridges and those located within cities, shall be not less than
fifty (50) feet wide, except those of a lesser width presently existing, and may be
as wide as required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of
the authority in charge of the construction and maintenance. Bridges located
outside incorporated cities shall be the same width to and across the river, creek or
stream as the highway leading to it.
I.C. 5 40-23 12. This statute made an exception to the fifty foot width requirement for highways
which were of a lesser width at the time the statute was enacted in 1887. There is no evidence in
the record before this Court that Camps Canyon Road existed prior to 1887, thus the exception is
inapplicable to the case at hand. The Plaintiffs have made various arguments claiming the width
of Camps Canyon Road should be limited only to the width of the surface of the roadway,
however, the facts of this case do not support this argument.
There is a long history in Idaho case law which explains and supports the purpose of a
public highway being a minimum width of fifty feet. This purpose was set forth by the Idaho
Supreme Court in _l_leserveyv. Gullford, 14 Idaho 133,93 P. 780 (1908).
It would seem that the right acquired by prescription and user carries with it such
width as is reasonably necessary for the reasonable convenience of the traveling
public, and, where the public have acquired the easement, the land subject to it
has passed under the jurisdiction of the public authorities for the purpose of
keeping the same in proper condition for the enjoyment thereof by the public. See
mitesides v. Green, supra. And, where the right is so acquired. such width must
be determined from a consideration of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. However. it must be borne in mind that the statute fixes the width of
highways at not less than 50 feet. and common experience shows that width no
more than sufficient for the proper keeping up and repair of roads generally.
Id. at 148, 93 P. at 785. While kfeservey was decided in 1908, it was more recently discussed in
1983, in Bentel v. Bannock County, 104 Idaho 130,656 P.2d 1383 (1 983). In Bentel, the Idaho
Supreme Court found that the fifty foot width of a public highway was necessary not only for
proper upkeep and repair of roads, but also for foreseeable public uses, such as sewage systems,
runoff, comrmunications and other services.
OPINION 2LVD ORDER ON PLADiTIFFS' blOTIONS
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iZii-eservey simply held that the state need not claim legal title to a highway in an
action filed to protect the public interest in a prescriptive roadway easement. It did
not address the scope of such easements, other than that one holding of the case is
that as to width a 50 foot easement denied by the trial court, being in line with
Sec. 932, Rev.Stat. (now I.C. $ 40-904) will be upheld, because "common
experience shows that width [is] no more than sufficient for the proper keeping up
and repair of roads generally." In more contemporary decisions, other
jurisdictions have held the scope of such easements comprehensive enough to
include reasonably foreseeable public uses of such roadways, such as subsurface
installations for sewage, runoff. communications and other services necessary to
the increased quality of life which generally accompanies the growth of
civilization. -'[A] highway easement acquired by prescription is no less
comprehensive than one acquired by grant, dedication or condemnation."

Id, at 133,656 P.2d at 1386 (internal citations omitted)
Thus, statutory authority establishes that fifty feet is the minimum width of a public
highway in Idaho. This minimum width encompasses the surface area of the roadway, as well as
area that is commonly referred to as the right of way. The right of way is that area of
t:ndeve!ol;ed land next to the highway which is necessary fa- the proper upkeep and repair of the
road.
The thrust of the Plaintiffs' claims in the case at hand are based upon the theory that the
width of Camps Canyon Road is limited to the actual surface of this roadway, without any area
for right of way. The Plaintiffs argue that this width continues to change with each improvement
made by the Highway District, such as the addition of gravel, or regular maintenance: such as the
plowing of snow. While the Plaintiffs may be correct that the u-idth of the actual roadway
surface continues to change, the Plaintiffs have established no basis for t h s Court to conclude
that there is an exception to the fifty foot minimum width requirement set forth in I.C. $ 40-23 12
and supported in rlileservey and its progeny.
The Plaintiffs fail to establish that the width of the highway easement is limited only to
the surface of the roadway of Camps Canyon Road. Therefore. as a matter of law, this Court
OPWIOX .&UD ORDER Oh' PLAINTIFFS' h1OTIONS
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determines that Carnps Canyon Road is a public highway which spans the width of fifty feet.
The fifty foot width of Camps Canyon Road encompasses the surface of the roadway, as well as
right of way necessary for the proper upkeep and repair of the road.
"[Ilt is well settled under Idaho law that any judgment determining the existence of an
easement must also specie the character, width, length and location of the easement." Schneider

v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767,774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2006); see also Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho
302. 261 P.2d 815 (1 953). This Court notes that Camps Canyon Road is located on the official
map of the Highway District, adopted in 1986. Afldavit of Dan Carscallen in Opposition to

Plaintfls' rblotionsfor Partial Sz~nzmaryJz~dgnzentfiledSeptember 19, October 6, and October
21, 2008. Further, as will be discussed in detail below, the road follows the same approximate
centerline as it did in 1974. Thus, the character, width, length, and location of the road are a
matter of public record and readily ascertainable. See Schneider, 142 Idaho at 774, 133 P.3d at
1239. The Plaintiffs have posited that the width of Camps Canyon Road is not fixed. but moves
every time gravel is added or the road is maintained or improved. For purposes of clarification,
the centerline of the actual surface of the roadway, which has remained the same since 1974,
establishes the midpoint of the fifty foot span. The fifbj foot width of the roadway is easily
ascertainable by measuring twenty five feet from the centeriine of the roadway to each side of the
road.

3. The Highway District's improvements and maintenance of Camps Canyon Road
occurred within the right of way and not beyond the width of the road.

The Defendants assen that Camps Canyon Road follows the same approximate centerline
now that it did in 1974. Affidavit of Dan Payne in Opposition to P l a i n f f i ' ,bfotions for Partial

Sz~mmar,vJildgmentjled September 19, October 6, and October 21, 2008; ,4fJ;davit of Orland
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Arneberg in Opposition to Plaintiffs ' hfototionsfor Partial Summary Judgment filed September 19,
October 6, and October 21, 2008; ThirdL4fjdavitof Dan Payne. In addition, surveyor Larry
Hodge affirmed the location of Camps Canyon Road in relation to the Plaintiffs' real property,
has not been changed in any significant degree between 1940 and 2004. See Affidavit of Larry
Nbdge. Further, the Highway District asserts that any actions taken to improve the road have
fallen within the fifty foot width of the roadway. AfJidavit ofDan Payne in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' ltfotionsfor Partial Summary Judgment filed September 19, October 6, and October
21, 2008; Affidavit of Orland Arneberg in Opposition to Plaintus' Motions for Partial
Sz~mmaryJudgment filed September 19, October 6, and October 21, 2008,
The Plaintiffs' fence is located within the right of way that is encompassed by the fifty
foot width of the road. AfJidavit of Dan Payne in Opposition to Plaintvs ' Motions for Partial
Summary J&dgn?entJ%edSeptember 19, Octcber 0, and October 21, 2008. The Plaintiffs aroue
0
the highway district has damaged their fence, pushed gravel six inches to the northeast: and
further daniaged the Plaintiffs as a result of issuing driveway permits to the Plaintiffs' neighbors.
the Wagners. Plaint~gs' AfJidavit in Support of P1aintiJj.S' itfotionfor Partial Summary
Jz-ldgvnentiil&udication of the Issue of the Xullz~cationof the Originul Prescriptive Right of Way
and Subsequent Burden of Proof ofPrescription; Plaintiffs ' AfJidavit in Stlpport of Plaintirs '
lLfotionfor Partial Summary Judgmen~:-l&udicationof the Issue of the Cause for Action LTnder
12 C<S.C. 1983; PlaintiSfs ' AAfJidavit in Support of Plaint@s' Answering Brief to Defendants'
Jfotion for Surnmnry Jt~dgmentand Reply to Defendants' dnswering Brief and Objection to
Plaintiffs' ibfotionfor Partial Summary Judgments and OfAer ,Motions Szlbmitted January 26,
2009. The Plaintiffs also rely on the affidavits of Ed Swanson, Ole Hanson. and Joe Yockey,
who have been long time residents of the area surrounding Camps Canyon Road. These
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affidavits establish that changes have been made to the road and that the road looks nothing like
it did a few years ago. Ed Swanson's First Afidavit; Ole Wanson's First Affidavit; Joe Yockey 's
First Affidavit.
In order to sustain an action against the Defendants for damage to their property, the
Plaintiffs must set forth facts which establish that the Highway District's actions occurred
beyond the purview of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road. The Plaintiffs argue that their
fence has been damaged, that gravel has been added to the road, that snow has been plowed, and
that the road has moved, however, based upon the record before the Court, all of these actions
occurred within the right of way of the road. The Plaintiffs have failed to refute the facts
presented by the Highway Department establishing that the centerline of the roadway has not
substantially moved and that any repairs made to the road have been done within the right of way
of the road. In response to a ,.notion f i r summaw jtldgment, the opposing partarty
must set ferth
Co.,
"specific facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 5S(e); Verbillis v. Dependable A4pplian~e
107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984).

The Plaintiffs have presented evidence that their fence was damaged by the Defendants'
in the course of maintaining the road. The Plaintiffs' belief that the width of the roadway is
limited to the surface of the road, and the fact that their fence is near the surface of the roadway
does not change the width of the entire public highway or create an issue of fact. The Plaintiffs
cannot rely on the fact that their fence is located within the right of way to establish possession of
property within the right of way.
Possession and use of an unused portion of a highway by an abutting
owner is not adverse to the public and cannot ripen into a right or title by lapse of
time no matter how long continued. Nor does such possession and use, even
though by express permission of the public authority, work an estoppel against the
public use. Even in the case of a highway established by user, all portions of the
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highway right of way need not be maintained and kept up at public expense. In
Boise City v. Sinsel, szt'pra, we held that an abutting owner who erected and
maintained a building on a portion of a public street under a permit granted by the
city council, for a period of 25 years, did not acquire a right to such occupancy,
and that the city was not estopped to cancel the permit and require the removal of
the building.
Rich v. Bzirdick, 83 Idaho 335, 345, 362 P.2d 1083, 1094 (196l)(internal citations omitted). The

Plaintiffs have not obtained any possessory rights to land within the fifty foot width of the road,
thus, the Plaintiffs' claims with regard to the fence fail.
The Plaintiffs also claim that the Highway District has taken additional property which
belongs to the Plaintiffs each time it has improved the roads. This claim is unsupported in fact,
and thus, is without merit. The purpose of a right of way alongside the surface of a roadway is to
allow room for appropriate maintenance, support, and improvements to the roadway. The
Highway District has acted within its authority to maintain Camps Canyon Road.

1. The Plaintiffs' takings daims fail because the Highway District's actions do not
exceed its statutory authoriQ or fall outside the scope of the right of way of
Camps Canyon Road.
The Plaintiffs claim that the Highway District has taken their property through inverse
condemnation, expansion, encroachment, alteration, and crossing the property line, amongst
other claims. The takings claims are based upon the Highway District's spreading of gravel over
Camps Canyon Road and the driveway permit the Highway District issued to the Plaintiffs'
neighbors. the U7agners.
As established above. Camps Canyon Road is a public highway established through
public use, with a minimum width of fifty feet. Improvements to the road and maintenance done
by the Highway District have occurred within the right of way encompassed by the total width of
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the public highway. Because the spreading of gravel and improvements to the road occurred
within the right of way, no taking of the Plaintiffs' property occurred.
A property owner who believes that his or her property, or some interest therein,
has been invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process
of law and the payment of just compensation, may bring an action for inverse
condemnation. hfcguillen v. City ofAwlrnon 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987).
The property owner cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless there
has actually been a taking of his or her property. Covington v. Jefferson County,
137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002). The determination of whether or not there has
been a taking is a matter of law to be resolved by the trial court. Id.

KibfST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003).
In Reisenaz~erv. State, Dept. offighways, 120 Idaho 36, 8 13 P.2d 375 (Ct. App. 199I), a
similar situation was addressed. In Reisenauer, the Plaintiffs filed a claim of inverse
condemnation after the State widened a portion of hightvay, even though the widening of the
highway occurred within the right of way.: Reisenauer is similar to the case at hand based upon
the fact that the widening of the highway occurred within the right of way. The Reisenaur Court
held that the widening of the road, within the right of way, was not a taking of the plaintiffs'
property.
Often. after land has been taken for a particular public use and devoted to that
use in the customary manner for a number of years. an increase in the public
requirements makes an altered or increased use of the land desirable. In such a
case, if the new use is of the same character as the use for which the land was
taken. and merely amounts to the advancement of the original purpose. as when
the wrought portion of a highway is widened so as to include the whole of the
original location, or a second track is laid upon a railroad right of way, there is
only an exercise of the easement which had been taken in the first place. and the
owner of the fee has no ground for complaint, even if he is deprived of privileges
in the land taken which he had previously enjoyed, or his remaining land suffers
damagesporn the increased use by the public from which i f hadpreviously been
exevnpt. All these damages were paid for uhen the original taking was made, and
The highwaq and r~ghtof way in question in Reisenauer were purchased bj the State in the 1930's, thus the
establishment of the public highway differs from the manner that Camps Canyon Road was established as a public
highway. The analysis from Rersenauer, however. is applicable to the case at hand. When the Highway Department
maintained and improved Camps Canyon Road, a11 changes to the highway occurred within the right of way.
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TEM NO. 3

TEM NO. 4

m O U E S T FOR PLH)MISSION NO, 3 :

3.1 The ;996 aiteeralisn exceeded the limits of "I@
prescriptive right of way In tile

followiflg manners:

a. Extension of the road bed and suppoiring structures beyand the old line
fence-the boundary set by the owner as the limit fTO the prescripdive right of way
and recognized by judicial custom and precedent as a prescriptive easement
boundary.

b. The usage Iirnit was narrow (less than f 2 feet) and a n y increase of width

(greater than 1 to 2%-less than 3 inches) would be considered to be In excess of
incidental variation.

c, The actual physical iocation of CCR was altered in the straightening sf the
curves and the extension of rhe road bed around the rock outcropping and the
washout of the roadbed.
d. The excavated trees (spontaneously growing-rton human planted, 60 to 80

years old) indicated there had been no road usage amongst or under then?.
e. Judicial custom and precedent recognizes the rebuttable presumptions of
ilzcation and width as being as is now as it was at the end of the prescriptive
period in the absence of known alterations. The 1996 agreement and the 1996
alteration rebut these prescrmpticlns of no change in CCR.

f. There is no archeological evidenw of a 50 fool highway ever existing in
Camps Canyon and more specifically the usage of the present CCR shows no

archeological evidence of ever being 50 feet wide with the natural occurrence of
rocks, trees, and steep terrain contradicting such a claim.
g. There is no objective evidence indicating a 50 foot h~ghwaywas ever
established in Camps Canyon.
RESPONSE:
Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. Object as to f o m of Request to the extent it calls for
legal conclusian. UTithoutwaiver of objection:

a. Denied.
b. Denied.
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e. A&&t&.
d. Denied.

e. Object to this subpart as it calls for a legal conclusion.
f. Denied.

g. Denied.
IUEOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4:

4.) The 1996 alteration was a "taking"of pn'vate propertgr (considered as a gift
dedication).
WESPONSE:
Object to relevance of 1996 activity. Object to this Request as it calls for a legal conclusion.

REQUEST FOR ADiMISSfON NO. 5:
5.) No pemission was given by Ed Swanson for future widening in the 1996

agreement,

-----

mSPONSE:
Object to relevme of 1996 activity. Object to fum of Request. Without waiver of
objection: A ~ h i a e das
, no such permission was requested by Defendant District.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6:
6,) Ed Swanson waived no future constitutional rights in the 1996 agreement.
RESPONSE:
Object to relevance of 1395 activity. Object to fonn of Request as no such waiver was
requested. UTi&outwaiver of objection: Admitted.

mQUEST FOR AD&IISSfCdN NO. 7:

7.) The 1996 alteration accomplished wkat the 1996 agreement entaited.

DEFENDNT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTFF'S FIRST REOLEST FOR ADMISSIONS

TEM NO. 5

Documents are set forth In these Responses to the FirstReqrnest For Admissions and/or these
Responses.
ITVTEmOCATOIIU 3 0 . 2 :

2.) Any change in the (a) use, (b) wrath, (c) locatton, or (a) nalureitype or tne rlgnt ot
waylhighway 05 CCR which may be in contravention to Idaho Statutes, Idaho State
Constitution, U S . Constitution, andlor Federal statutes andfor is disputed by an abutting
landowner may be adjudicated by what NLCHD available means? Please be complete
in your answer indicating the name of the means (process),the format of the process,

and how the m e a n s (process) is initiated ftf the format has a written forrn andlor a
written self explanatot?/form, this is suFiicient to cite the form and where to obtain a
copy.), and what form would the decision come in (written andlor verbal)?
RESPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as it calls for a legal conclusion and/or legal advice.

IN'FERROGATBPQVNO. 3:

3.) tist all available information and documents you know of, the names, addresses,

phone numbers and whereabouts of anyone, who may have infarmation of or the
possession of documents concerning the acquisition of the prescriplivs right of

waylhighvvay, CCR, the time of the prescriptive period for the pres~iptiveright of
waykighway, CCR, the establishment of the prescriptive right of waylhighway, GGR,
and for the width, location and use of the prescriptive right of way, CGR, at the end of
the prescriptive period for the prescriptive right of waylhighway, CCR.

-

RESPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as unduly burdensome and oppressive in that it covers an
unlimited time frame and seeks infomation and documents not reasonabIy calculated to Iead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. U'ithout waiver of objection, Documents regarding CCR
in KLCHD's possession are primarily District foreman's journals and Commissioner Minutes.
Width of CCR M-askvidened oil the north side in I996 to approximately its present width. CCR

DEFENDANT'S ESPONSES TO Pt

EFS' FRST TNTEmOGATORES

was widened on south side in 2005 and 3006 by approximately four feet of road surface and the

addition of sloping cut banks. Ail District Co

the CCR where subdistrict is located have knowledge of this infomation.
LII'TEPZWOGATOIRY NO. 6:

6.) What isiare the points of difficulty in the resolution of the disptiae with the
Hai~~orsons?

mSPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as not relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

INTERP2;OGATQ)RYNO. 7:

7.) Do you consider the Haivorsons' complaints frivolous?
mSPONSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as not relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

8.) if #7 is an a~iirmativeanswer, please state what evidence you would have to suppori
a finding the Hafvsrsons have no complaint of legal merit and!or no disputed

facts.
mSPBIeiSE:
Object to this Interrogatory as not relevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
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Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, idaho, 83537

(208)289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180

)

Plaintiffs
vs.

ED SWANSON'S FIRST AFFIDAVIT

1

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )
Commissioners for the North Latah County

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

)

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

1

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

Dan Payne. in his Official Capacity and in his

)

Defendants

STATE OF
..bL>hhrr-Cr-C1c

1
P,

)ss.
C0~111t>of

1

Ed S\x7ansondeposes and saj7s:

I j I a113 m ) M ife are the pre\,ious on iiers ro the farm including the SENE Section 15
T39N R3WBM. except for the hi-acre parcel as described in the deed and count>-records, h l ~
father onned the same farm before I did and may grandfather onned it before 1113 fati~er.

ED SIi 4NSOY.S FIRST XFFlD.4\-1T
1

2) This farm had been in

nnjr famil) 's ifather

and grandfather possession for in excess of

70 >ears and I ha\ e li\ ed in the area rnj \\hole life.

3j This farm 1%as used for timber, f'rirniing and pasture of lit estock.
3) I sold t l i s far111 to the tIai\ orsons in December of 1996.

5) I11 the fail of 1996. prior to 112) selling the fan1 to t11e Halvorsons and during the
preliminary stages of a g r e e i ~ ~tog sell the farm to the l-lalvorsons. Dan Payne contacted me about
~llakingchanges to Camps Canyon Road, irt the \vest end of the SENE of Section 15. in the area
of the 3-1- acre parcel.

6) To the best of my recollection the matters which Dan Pa!*ne talked to me about m7ere
(a) cutting dour11 some trees. (b) straightening curves at east and west ends of the P/acre
parcel, (c) pushing the road base to tlie northeast aroutid a rock outcropping of the road. K e u
Ilouses viere being built in the can:

011 and

residents Rere complainillg of not being able to tra? el

to their houses.

7) It mas rn? inrention to and L ga\ e mq verbal pern~issionfor the SLCFID to accoil~plish
these changes that Dan Paqne talked about. I intended to gift an: nzcessa~-qland to the road
district for road purposes.

8) As I u a s in the process of selling this farm to the Halvorsons, I talked mith Don
Ifah orson soon after rnj conversation with Daa Payne about T;\ hat I had gii en m j per111issiol-1 for
\\hat the H~ghi$ajDistrict nanted to do, as 1 k i t i ~ shouio
e
ne axyare or ihese iilrng~.

9) It is ni: recollection that Doii I-Tal\rorson agreed isith m> decision and that he felt that
it kvas best for all coilcerned ( the nen residents in the canyon) to alter the road.
10) h'either I. nor m j opinion of Don Halvorson"~intention. expected an5 conlpe~lsatiort
for the land. excax ation of trees. or damage to the old fence or an! of its re~llainiligcornponents
of M ire and/or posts. A11 matters nere col~sideredb! us (I and rn: recollection of Don Hal\~orson
opinion) that permission mas g i en
~ and all land taken was given.
1I ) There n as an old Line fence 01.1 tile north side of Camps Canjvon road and it n a s in

need of repair and mt recollection of Don Hal\ orson \%asthat he unquestionabl> accepted the
responsibility to reconstruct it at his 0x5 n time 311d eupense.

ED SU-AXSON'S FIRST IZFFID-AYIT
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R hen

time and i%
eather permitted

and the alteration of the road was completed. Since that time I tlave not been aLvare of anytl~ing
otherwise.
12) During the late spring or early surnmer of 1997,nly ~vifeand I n7eretrai~eiingacross
Carnps Canyon Road and we ran into Don Halvorson bj the fence uliich he had b~litt.M j wife.
Glad: s. commented to Don illat it was a nice fence. I asked Don u11y he had built the fence so
far from the edge of the road and said he didn't need to gi1.e the Highwa!. District so much land.
Don said it was best to lea\ e a buffer bet\?teen the road and fence for maintenance, snom
remo.ia1, and that lie waslz't g i ~ i n gthe Iaild to the t-figb~zayDistrict.

13) My mife and I have found Doll and Charlotte to be truthful. honest, and cooperati1.e
and sinceretj accommodatii~gin all or an) dealings Me l-tave had \\it11 them. The! are and s t r i ~e
to be good neighbors.
14) I have had no reason to believe that I needed in any \zay to have to check up on the
NLCHD to ensure that thej accomplished \%hate.irerlegal matters Ifiej \bere required to do.
The abo1.e statements are true to the best of m\ knou Ie_itge.A----,/
L.-
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Dor! Halal~rson

1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, idaho, 83537

(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, iN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180

)

Pfaintiffs

OLE HANSON'S FIRST AFFIDAVIT

1

VS.

North tatah County Highway District; Board of )
Commissioners for the North Latah County

}

Highway District, Briand Arneberg. Richard

1

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;
Dan Payne. in his Official Capacity and in his

j

Individual Capacity

1

Defendants

STATE OF ID-4I-fO )
)ss
Countj of Latah

)

Ole Hails013deposes and 534 S:

I) I ha\ e !i\ed in the area all 21: life and all1 familiar cl-.n.ith Carinp's Can) on Road in
Section 15.

2 ) 1 farrrted xx i:h m: l3rother. Lars!- Hanson. for malq !,ears

01s

120th Burnt Ridge and

L.lttle Bear Ridge and travelled Camps Can! on Road through seciioll 15 often as it

OLE H.%NSOh S FIRST ,-2FF1D.A.2\'1?
'

as a

co::rwiie~~r1

~

h2e r ~~ ~ r the
e e ~ridges to MO\T farm machinery as there I\ as s erj Iirtle if an: traffic

on the road.

3) In those years, prior to the recent changes staring around 2005. Camps Cailyocr Road
was a narrow, one lane road. It was difficult to move large machinery across Camps Canyon
Road as the road n as \ erj narrolh. but also rhere were feu piaces to pass ol~conliilgtraffic.
4) hi14 brother, La1-r) Hanson and I farmed tlie Hanis'f-Tuff place (no\ii the U'agner farnil
for many j ears. I11 later 5 ears Lar-ry farm it b! himself
5) MJ brother. Lars? Hanson and I accessed the Harris 'Huff place frc7m Camps Can? on
Road. approximately due south of &here the Ifal.c.orsons' corral is nov\ and ma~.bea little to the
east of where the f-Ialvorson's gate is non.

6 ) In those years, uhen \ye fartlled the Harris 'Eltiff place. L%~lsrin
S\n,anson and later his
son Ed Ss\ansol~owned the land north and east of Calllps Can? on Road from ixhere \s e entered
the Harris~l-lufffarm.
7 ) I renlember that there 1%
as a properry Iine east of the entra~lceto the Warris:I-luE farm
as oncc I considered cutting ha?

011 the

grassy dram east of the entrance and .4ustin S s ~ a ~ ~told
son

me that there Lxas a propert! line there and that the draw, mas on his place. -2cccss to the
Harris If iff place \?,as\r, est of that drav .
8) Camps Canj on Road has changed so rnuch in the recent !ears: it is hard to rel~lcrnher

exact!?

hoxx it used to run. but it 1ool;s nothing like it did a fen bears ago.

///y
1

The above state~~ients
we itrtle io the best of m! i;l~o.c.\iedee.
Dated rhis

a! of

-

-

,-Y
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/~&ew--%e-

~ i i kanson
e
SCRSCRIRED AXD S\\;OKV TO before me this/Etii da) o f - f d . ,2009

i

'

>/?I

corrrlnission expires: / n - r/.A $0
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1 hereb) cenif? that on this a t 1 1 daj oikEi~,+---?009.I caused a rruc and correct cop! of
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[ ] U.S. Mail
( j Federal Express Standard Ovenlight Mail
[ I FAX (208) 883-4593
[ x ] Hand Delivery

RONALD J. LANDECK
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE &
GR4H24h/i,P.A.
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P.O. Box 9334
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CARL B. KERRICK
DISTRICT JUDGE
P.O. Box 896

[XI U.S. Rilail
[ 1 Federal Express Standard 01ernight R4ai 1
1 ] FAX
Don Halvorson
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Don Ha!vorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537

(208) 289-5602
PlaintiM, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tt-iE 5EC'OqD .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-NO

)

Plaintiffs

JOE YOCKEY'S FIRST AFFIDAVIT

)

vs .

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )

Commissioners for the North Latah Cotfnty

)

Highway District. Orland Arneberg. Richard

)

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity ana in his

)

Individual Capacity
Defendants

1

-

STATE OF IDAHO 1
)ss.

Co~lnt?of Latah

1

Joe 1-ockej deposes and sa: s:

I ) I iivc on C l a ~ p i Road
t

111

Trtr~.lIda'i 3.

3) I ha\ e 111,cdiiz the are; fci ~ i 11i1:$ li:.:.

..nd

. ~ork
l

,it ; \ggrng, hi-mir~gdnJ ralring cattle

3) I logged for Ed S\tallson as \<ell as ibr the Hall c rsilns in secrion 15 1-395 R3M.Bhl.

I) I an1 familiar with Camps Canyon Road as it was prior to all the recent changes. as I
has~eworked in this area for several years.

5) There 1 ~ a alxz
s a),s a fence which ran along rhe northeast side of Callips Canyon Road
west of the old bull pilie trees before the Highwa) District ntade zlterations to the road. After
those alterations the Hal\ orso~lsrebuilt the fence a Nays off of the edge of the road.

6) The Hal\~orsonsbuilt a conal at tlie edge of the can! on north of Canlps Cali? 011 Road
after the Highuaq District i~iadechanges in the road there sl-tortly after tlie Halx~orso~is
brought
that farn fiom tfle Sls ansons.

7) I wintered ~ n COWS
?
at the Halvorsons corral for 3 fevr years after t l ~ emoved
~
their
cox\ s dowri near Jufiaetta where the)

Iik ed.

Dtlriiig those >ears, the neighbor, Johii Van Houten

and I plowed tlie snow on the road \\hen necessarq as the Higllwaj District did not plou snom on
Camps Canyo11Road in section 15.

8) The 1--tighvvaqDistrict bas made so mas! changes to Camps Canyon Road bq7 the
Hal\ orso~iscorral that it is hard to remeniber I\ hat the old road looked like. Prior to the recerit
cl-ianges in tile road. Camps Canyon Road in the area of the 11alxrorsons' corral bias a narroxi
road. big enough for orllj one x~eliicle3t a time. and there ne1.e old. big trees on both sides of the
road and there qras an old fence that ran along the nortli side of the road Sor as Ion9 as I can
remember.

9) Personall?. I hax e fences along the edge of Claypit Road and I have mox ed tliern out a
fe12 times and 1 h21 e fottnd that no matter \that I do, the H i g h 3) District grades into nr ploxxs
oxer my fences. I ha\ e complained but the> salt the) liax e a right to do this.
The abox e statenlents are true to the best of m j liiio~vledge.

JOE J'0CF;I:Y.S FIRST %FFID,2\71T
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Don Haivorson

1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537

(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife))

Case No. CV 2008-180

)

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

1

TO STRIKE

Plaintiffs
vs .

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )
Commissioners for the North Latah County

1

Highway District, Oriand Arneberg, Richard

)

Mansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

1

Capacities, and in their individual Capacities;

j

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

}

Individual Capacity
Defendants

'l

Plaintiffs Don and Charlotte Halvorscrn 11x0s e this Caul? to strike poltions of Defendants.
Affida~its fiied herein on February 13. 2009 and Febrtiar) 2. 3003 and Nos ember 4. 3005 as
follo\vs:

1. A11 statements attributed to an) person otlier than Defendant Arneberg and all
testinmnj offered bj Dekndant hneberg in .?ffida\-it of Orland Arneberg in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' %lotions for Partial Surs11?1ar~J~ldgrnenlFiled September 19. October 6 and October
2 1. 2008 as to a ilzatier I.\ ithout his personal i i ~ l oledge
~ i of tile matter in paragrap11 7

h i d are

either inadmissible hearsa) or lack foundation. Through d i s c o ~erj Plaintiffs I~a\-erequeqred t h ~
Defendant.; bring forth srrcli agsncj records of public e\ identiar~hearings regarding the
sstablish~l~ent
of Camps Gal:) on Road. in the pertiile~itpart and the? ha1.e ii~dicatedto Plain~~fis
that

110

such hearings ha\ e tallen place. Furthermore Dzfe~~dant
~lnieberg.ixould noi ha\ e been

able to 11a~
personal kilo%Iedgc for f i e~q ears prior to 1930 of public use and maiiirei~ancefor at
least five j ears prior to 1930. izotwithstanding that a cor~clusorqstatelllent is adequate
replacement for a public hearing that pro\ ides evidence that Camps Canyon Rosd has been liept

up and worked at the public expense at least for f i e~years before !930.

2. All statements attributed to any person other than Defendant Ameberg and all
testin-ioaq offered bq Defendant Ar~icbergin ,4ffidavit of Orlarzd Arneberg in Oppositior~to
Plaintiffs' h.iotiolis for Partial Summarj Judgnlent Filed September 19. October 6 a11d October

2 1. 2008 as to a matter

LT itllout

his persolla1 homledgc of the matter in paragraph 8 \ \ h ~ c are
l~

e~therinadmissible hears::) or lack foundation
3 All statemenrs attributed to a11j person other than Defendant Arneberg and ail
testimo11j offered b~ Defendant Arrieberg in .oiffida~it of Orland -2rneberg ill Opposition to
Plaintiffs' M o t i o ~ ~for
s Partial Summarj Judgment Filed September 19. October 6 and October
2 1.2008 as to a matter

\T

ithout his personal hrno1.t ledge of the matter iiz paragraph 9 M Iltch are

itither illadmissible hearsaj or lack foundation. Not all prescriptil e rights of n a y are 50 f'cer
~ i d ePrescriptive
.
rights of \lay require e\ idence sllo\j\iilg that the: hate been used and M orhed
and kept up at the expense of the public fbr i?\ e j ears to the extent of 50 feet.

4.Ali statements attributed to an) person other than Dan Carscallen and all testinnonq
offered b j Dan Carscalle~~
in Afida\ it of Dan Carscallen in Opposition to Plai~ltiffs'34c)tions
for Par~ialSummar! .Iiidgment Filed September 19. October 6 and October 21. 2008 as to a
matter \\itl~ctuthis personal l\no.izledge of ti12 matter in paragraphs 3 snd 4 n f i ~ c hare e1rhz.r
inadi~iissibieilearsaj or lack fou~ldatioli.I.C. $ 30-202( 1 ) does riot aultllorize Commissioners to

FLII-II?J
1' B O L I Iiif
"~
ad-judicate the status of an? road as pllhlic or pri\ ate (see IjOi77~~ltind
Con~cn'rs Tefo~?
C01!171j.srnie uj-J[j~il?o.
141 Idaho 8 5 5 , !19 P 3ci 630 (10051).

PL3A!X?'TFFS' 34OTION T C? STRIKE

-

-

5. -411statenlents attributed to an> person other than Defendant Payne and all testilnon~
offered b> Defendant Pajxe in Affidavit of Dan Paylle in Opposition to Plaintiffs' -Motions for
Partial Summar) Judgnlent Filed September i 9. October 6 and October 21. 2008 3s to a nlatter
~vithouthis personal knowledge of the matter in paragraph 5 bvhich are either inadmissible
Item No, 4. ai 3-4,
I1earsa.l or lack foundation. See Pluinliffs ' P-ourrh Rcciir-dS~q7j?/ei?~c~nf,
Request For .4dmission Yo. 3 subpart c. and Plairzrifis ' F~ur.li?Xecor.d SZIJ?~?/~P?ZCM/.
Item No. 5.
at 4,I~~terrogator>
s o . 31 (Defeildan~Pa! ne does not ~nentionaddrng f o t ~ Seet
r to the north side
of the 1iort1l side of the road in 1996. he simpl? sa: s the phq sicai location changed and he
widened it to the north: plaintiffs ha\ e no act~lal~neasurenlentsof either as recorded b j
Defendants nor orders of Commissio~lersto lag ottt and or ho~bfar to widen or mo1 el.
6. A11 statenlents attributed to an! person other than Defelldal~tPa! ne and all t e s t i r n o ~ ~ ~

offered h ~Defendant
,
Pa:! ne in Affida.i.it of Dan Payne in Opposition to 131aintiffs' Motions h r
Partial Sullirnarq Sudgmetit Filed Septell~ber19. October 6 and October 2 1, 2008 as to a ii~atter
wit110~1this persona1 knowledge of tile matter in paragraph 6 nhich are either inadlnissible
hearsa? or Iack foundation. See Plair~tifls' Foztr/h R ~ C ~ ~ ~ , % ( I ? J ? /Tie111
C I ~S?oC. I4.? at
~ .3-4.
Request For ."t~nission Yo. 3 subpart c. and Pli;ri~rljfs Fozirih RCL.C>!*~
Szrj?l21crr.rci?f.Iten1 No 5.
'

at 4. Interrogator> No. 3 ) (Defendant Pajnc's log does not mention adding four fect to the north

slde of the ~ ~ o rside
t h of the road in 1996. he si111pIj saq7sthe phq sical locatloll changed and he
\ii

idened it to the north: plaintiffs have no actual measurerl1cnts of either as recorded b j

Defendants nor orders c.f Commissio~lersI O !q out and or I;OMl j r 10 13 iden or mots).

7. !ill statements attributed to ant person other illan Defe:cllda~itPa! ne and all teszlrnon!
offered b~ Defendant Paj nc in Affidavit of Dan Payne in Opposition to Plaintiffs' hlotions for
Partial Sum~?zar]Judgment Filed September 19. October 6 and October 2 1. 2008 as to a matter
t~itfiout 111s persolial

bnon ledge of the matter in paragraph 8 R hich are either inadr?;issible

hearsa3 or lack foundation. (see PIoii?f<fi' T11ii.d Record S~q7:?lei77enf.Itern 30.3 . at 1 6- 17.
Interrogator) Nos. 1 0 - 4 1 (Defcndai~tP a ~ n esa: s he has mu\ ed ihe cer~terlineand no records
shnu hi\\\ n~uc!~).

8. $11 staten~entsattributed to an> person other iban Defendant Pajrne and all testimoil!
offered b? Defendant Payne in Affida~it of Dan Pal ne in Opposition to Plaintiffs' hlotioi~sfor
Partial Strmmarq .Judgrr~el-it
Filed September L 9. October 6 and October 2 1. 2008 as to a nlatter
tt-ithout his personal lLr2otiIedge of the matter in paragraph 1 I ~ h i c hare either inadnlissible
hearsa? or lack fotnlclation. Defciidants 1la-je no e\kkmce in their records for this conclusion.

9. All statelileilts attributed to an) person other than Defendant Payne and all testimonq
offered by Defendant Paj ne in Second Affidavit of Dan Payne as to a matter without his
personal k n o ~ l e d g eof the matter in paragraph 3 wllich are either inadmissible hearsay or lack
foundation. ,411 statements attributed to Mr. Swanson.

10. All stateme~ltsattributed to any person other than Defendant Pa! ne and all testimony
offered bq Defendant Pajne in Affidaxrit of Dan Paqne in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Rlotions ibr
Partial Summary Judgmeilr Filed September 19. October 6 and October 21. 2008 as to a nlatter
mithout his personal Iino:\Iedge of the matter in paragraphs 6. '7. 8. 9.a i d or 10 ~hIc1-iare either
inadillissible fiearsaj, or lack foundation. All statements attributed to Mr. U7agner. All
statements attributed to hlr. Hail orson.
1 I. -411testiirionq offered by hlr. Hodge in .4ffida\ it ;?f Larrq J. I-Iodge as to 3 matter

kxithout his personal bnonledge of the matter in paragraph 8 \.\hich arc either i~ladinissible
hearsaj or lack foundation. Statement that the 7 940 aerial photo includes the drive\%a> sen inp
the V.-agners' real propert) axid the consistencq of 3.3 acres u ith the 191 1 deed of 3-i- acres and
that the southerl~boundarj of b7agners' real property r u ~ x ~ i nong a southeasterf:, course.
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs request the Court strilte those ite~nslisted abo\ e as
ixlad~llissibieand or 1101 to be co~lsideredill cor~nectionw ith Defendants' pending Rlotions for
Partial Summarj Jrrdgment. Plait~tiffsalso nlo\ e to strike from the record factual assertions bq
Defendants made \I ~tllouttheir personal know ledge or that constiitite ir~admissiblelrearsa~set
T IDefe~~dants'
Motion for
ib~-thIn Defenda~xs'h/lo:ron for Summarj Judgment. Brief in S U ~ P O of
S ~ m m a r qJudgr~lent.and Defendal-its' .4nsu eriilg Brief and Objeciiolls to Ptaintiffss' llotions for
partial Sum111ar> Judgments and Other R.lotions Submitted Jar~uarq26, 2009 the speclfic

PL,*IIN TIFFS' MOTIOZ TO STRIKE

1

identification of ijhich ill Defendants' ra~ishlingpage docuineni are too numerous to effiiicienti~

This Motion is based. it1 part. tipon Rules 56(3ej and (g) I.R.C.P. \\.l-iicii require that
evidence sr~bmirtedin summary judgment proceedings ..sha!I set forth facts.. .adnlissible in

Plaintiffs request oral argunseilt in support of this motion.
On thls 1 7"'Da) of Fcbrctar: . 200'1

i r i 14

RESPECTFULLY St'Bh4ITTED.
Don Halvorson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herehj certify that on this I 71hday of February. 2009. I caused a true and correct cop!
of this docume~~t
to be ser\zed on the follon ing indix idual in the manner indicated belo\\ :

GRAF-ZA4h/f.
P.A.
3 14 S. Jefferson
P 0 Box 9314
scom. ID 83843
ARL B. KEXRICIC
ISTRICT JUDGE

1 [ ] FAX (208) 883-1593
[XI Hand DeIi\,erj*
I

eder-a1 Esprcss Standard 01emight h'iall

8-350 1 -0896

Don Halvorson

RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LAXDECK. P.C.
693 Stjmer Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4592
Attorneys for Defendants

I-N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DON 8L CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2008- 180
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION
TO STRIKE AND BRIEF

1's.
NORTH LATAN COljhrTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
THE KORTH LATAI-I COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT. ORLA?;D ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN P A F J E . in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,

1
1
)

)
)
)
)

1
1

Defendants.

Defendants North Latah County High\srayDistrict, Orland Anleberg, Richard Kansen,
Shennan Clyde and Dan Pajne, through counsel, move this Court to strike portions of Plaintiffs'
Fourth Record Supplement, Plaintiffs' Affidavit, Joe Yockey's First Affida~itand Plaintiffs'
Answering Brief, all of which were filed herein on February 1 7:2009, as follows:

DEFEhD.+.NTS' SECOYD MOT105 TO STRTKE .4ND B E E F -- I

1. PLr?tTTIFFS' FOURTH RECORD SUPPLEMENT:
1.I

Iterr, XOS.!

2, set fr,rfh in paragzphs 3 and 3. arc inadnissiblc hearsay, lack

foundation and lack proper certification.
1.2

Item Nos. 3(a) - (v). including all photogaphs and documents and Plaintiffs' narrative
statements both on the photogaplis and within the text of said Supplement, for lack of
adequate foundation and proof of authenticity.

1.3

Item Nos. 3(r), (s) and (u) which are inadmissible hearsay and Lack adequate foundation
and proper certification.

2. PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT:
3.1

A11 testimony offered by Plaintiffs in paragraph 2 as to matters without their personal

knowledge for Iack of adequate foundation.

3.2

All statements attributed to Dan Payie and Ed Su~ansonin paragaph 8 which are

inadmissible hearsay and/or lack adequate foundation. Further, all statements beginning
wit11 the phrase, "Prior to these alterations" on page 3, through the phrase. "Martin Huff,
et aL'^ on page 4 for Iack of adequate foundation. Further, all statements attributed to
Larry Hansen in paragraph 8 which ax-e inadmissible hearsay.
2.3

All statements attributed to Mr. Wagner in paragraph 9 which are inadmissible hearsay.

2.4

hllf statement by Plaintiffs in paragaph 9 as to matters without their personal

knowledge for lack of adequate foundation.
2.5

AII staternents by representative of Clearwater Power Co111pany or statements regarding

conduct by CIeamater Po:ver Company in paragaph I I which are either inadmissible
hearsay or lack adequate foundation.
2.6

A11 statements attributed to Mr. Munson in paragraph 12 k~hichare inadmissible

hearsay.
DEFE?DANTS' SECOR'D hlOTIOX TO STRlhE -4ND BRIEF -- r?
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.4fI statements a ~ . b u t e dco Patsy Warmer and Gary Osborne in paragzph 13 ~~vhicfi
we
t
inadmissible hemay and s!l tes:irnony offcred by Plaintiffs as to a ?iiatter ~ i t h o i ltheir

personal knowledge of the matter in paragraph 13 for lack of adequate foundation.
2.8

All testimony offered by Plaintiffs in paragraph 15 for lack of adequate foundation and
wfiicll are based on inadmissible hearsay.

3.9

All statements attributed to Mr. Wagner in paragrap11 15 which are inadmissible
hearsay.

2.10

All statements in paragaph 16 which are oral testimony offered by Plaintiffs as to

matters without their persolla1 knowledge for lack of adequate foundation.
2.1 1

All testimony offered by Plaintiffs in paragraph 24 for lack of adequate foundation.

2.12

All testimony offered by Plaintiffs in paragraph 26 for lack of adequate foundation.

2.13

All statements in paragaph 27 which are not rele~rantto this proceeding.

3. JOE YOCKEY'S FIRST AFFIDAVIT:

3.1

All testimony offered by Mr. Yockey in paragraph 5 for lack of adequate foundation.

3.2

AH testimony offered by Ms. Yockey in paragraph 8 for lack of adequate foundation.

1 1

All testimony offcred by Mr. Yockey in paragraph 9 as not relevant to this proceeding.

3.2

4. PLAINTIFFS' AhTS14rERIIC'GBRIEF:
4.1

A11 testimony offered by Plai~ltiffDonHalvorson as to what the John Dunn sun7ey

shows and Mr. Halvorson's i~lterpretationsand applications of tlze Du11n sun-ey for lack
of adequate foundatio~land xxhich are based on inadmissible hearsay.
4.2

All testimony offered by Plaintiff Don Halvorson as to statements by Ed Swanson
which are inadmissible hearsay.

DEFEwD4NTS' SECOSD hlOTION 'I0STRIKE 4TD BRIEF -- 3

1.3

,411 statements by Plaintiff Don Halvorson as to the location, movenent, \vidth,
condition an&or mainte~znceof Camps Crtnpr, Road prior to !996. :vI.ieh are based
upon inadmissible hearsay or lack adequate foundation.

4.4

All statements by Plaintiff Don Halvorson attributed to Wagners which are inadmissible

hearsay.
4.5

A11 statements by Plaintiff Don Halvorson as to Defendants' intentions for lack of

adequate foundation.
This Motion is based, in part, upon Rules 56(e) and (g) I.R.C.P. which require that evidence
submitted in summary judgment proceedings "shall set forth facts.. .admissible in evidence."
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants request t11e Court strike those items listed above as
inadmissible and/or not to be considered in connection with Plaintiffs' pending Motions for Partial
Surnmav Judgment and other Motions subxnitted February 17,2009.
Defendar~tsrequest oral argument in support of this motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of February, 2009.
RONALD J. LX4NDECK,P.C.
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By:
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Rfnald J. Landeck
Attonleys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby ceriif.y.that an this 24th day cf Febmaq, 3009,Icii'csed a me and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON EIALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HL4LVORSOK
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
ISENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ X] U.S. Mail
[
Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ IFAX
[ ] Hand Delivery

i

~ o n d J.
d Landeck
P

i
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
ROXALD J. LANDEGIS, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow. ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

mTTHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COLWTY OF LATAH
DON 6)L CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife).
Plaintiffs,
1's.

NORTH L'4TAI-I COUNTY HICHWlZY
DISTRICT: BOARD OF COMMISSIOXERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAH CObTTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SIIEKUAIV CLYDE, in their individual
capacities: DAN PAYXE. in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

)
)

1
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2008-1 80
DEFEKDL4NTS'MOTION TO
ENLARGE TEME

1
)
)
)
)
)
)

1
)

1

Defendants move to enlarge time under Rule 6(b) I.R.C.P. to file Defendants' Rep1y
Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Jud+ment. As grounds therefore,
Defendants' CounseI asserts that the length and breadth of Plaintiffs*A n s ~ ~ e r i nBrief
g require
additional time.

d t F E h D A h T S ' hPlii??Oli TO E : L W G E TIME -- 1

T.-

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of February, 2009.
RON 4LD J LAXDECK, P.C.

(u'&L4v~&rqb*4L
li

By:

&

Rondld
J. Landeck
i
Attcifneys for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 24th day of February, 2009,I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KEKDRICK. IDAHO 83537

[ X] U.S. &Jail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ IFAX
[ ] Hand Delivery
$

i

~2jn\~&+i
V
Ronald J. tandeck
i

i
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R O N U D 1.LMhBECK, ISB No. 3901
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 S t p e r Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, EIl 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUf31CIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COLILTTYOF LATAE-I
DON & CIlARLOTTE HALVORSBN
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,

1
) Case No. CV 2008-1 80

1

) THRD *4FFDAVIT

OF DL45P A n T

1

VS.

NORTH LATAN COUr\TTU EIIGHUJAY
DISmICT; B0,ARD OF COMMTSSIONERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAH COUhTY WIGErPUTAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND AR,\iEBERG, RLCIIARf)
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DL4NP A W , in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

i

1
1
i

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.

County of Latah

1

Dan P a p e , upon oath, deposes and says:
1. 1am a Defendant in this matter, am over eighteen (18) years of age, am competent to
testify to the matters set forlh herein and make this affidavit upon my personal howledge.

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DAX E)-4\5E -- 1
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2. 1haye been employed by Defendant Xortb tatah County Highway District
("Dishict") since 1974 and District foreman since 1934. Since 1974, my duties for District
foreman have included maintaining and improving projects on Camps Canyon Road with tine
prim8r-j- difference being that, as hrernan, i oversee and supervise the Districtss vIiork instead of
doing it.
3. 1have reviewed portions of Plaintiffs' Answering Brief related to alleged changes in

Camps Canyon Road. In particular, 1have read the following statement from Plaintiffs'
Answering Brief found on pages 56 and 57 thereof ("Plaintiffs' AlIegations"):
It may have been extended and started in a different place as the southern
property line was shifted north and the curves at the east end of the 3+/- acre
parcel were straightened in 1996 (see PEai?zt$fs ' 71zird Record Supple~~zent,
Item
Xo. 13, at 10-11, Interrogatory No. f 6). These two facts alone account for more
than I00 feet of the Ioss of road frontage as the change in the curves resulted in
the road and the east property line paralleling each other for a short distance and
the property line had to chase the road for an additional 30 feet (more than the
shift of 50 feet to the north in the southern property line) (see PIaintifs ' Fourth
Record Sui7plemeizt, Item KO.3, at 20 (photo looking due south along east
property line (this photo was taken in 2006 after the Highway Dishict cleared the
last remaining evidence of the 8 foot e m b a r b e n t left by the 1996 alteration in
the late summer of 2006)), as sited by the two posts showing how the post 7 996
road parallels the property line and thus a loss or road frontage; as the catcufation
of road frontage does not start until the east property line crosses the centerline of
the road; there may be parts of the old road which are geosaphically 50 and 84
feet from the post 1996 road but the distance varies thoughout the 700 or so feet
of the road)) and another 20 plus feet as the west intersection moved north 500
feet and the east intersection moved north 80 plus feet. This sfiift to the north
resulted in another untowasd effect in regards to the old historic driveway as
north is down hill and the road bed necessarily dropped down hill from where the
height of the historic driveway met the road and left an 8 foot emb
Plairztzfls ' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at f 7@hoto looking due south
along east property line (this photo was taken in 2006 after Waglers built their
znddriveway in June of 2006 and about three months before Plaiiztfi ' Fowrh
Records Supplei;tzent,Item No. 3, at 20). ...

4. KOpart of Plaintiffs' Allegations is based in fact based apon my obsenrations as an

employee of the District since 1974 and based upon my observations ofihe terrain adjacent to
Camps Canyon Road.
5. C a p s Canyon I;;oad foIIows the same approximate centerline now as it did in 1374,

and,in my opinion, as it has throughout its history. There is no physical evidence that a road
was located "550 and 84 feet" from the road as it existed in 1996 as alleged by Plaintiffs. There is
no visual evidence that an "old road" existed anywhere at any time near Camps Canyon Road

other than over and upon the location of Camps Canyon Road as it exists today.

6. Plaintiffs' Allegations suggest that the "change in the curves'' or "straightening" of
Camps Canyon Road account for a Ioss in the road frontage of C a p s Canyon Road compared to
the 699 feet described in the &Tapers' deed. As I stated in the Second Affidavit of Dan Payne
filed herewith, I personally measured the distance "699 feet, more or less, along the County
Road." That distance placed me "a great distance past the post Mr. Wagner had set for his
southeasterly comer and was south of the old driveway and approximately one hundred feet
south of the approach for which the permit had been issued." The only "change in the curves" of
Camps Canyon Road in this area occurred as a result of the widening of Camps Canyon Road in
the vicinity of the "bold driveway" &ich was well over 600 feet fiom the northwesterly boundary
of the 3+!- acre parcel. There is absolutely no basis for m y statement by Plaintiffs that the
District's widening or sh.ai&tening of Camps Canyon Road changed the dimensions along the
centerline of Camps Canyon Road by more than a minimal distance. if at all. I have marked with
a circled "X" and arrow with my initials at the end of the arrow on two documents tfie location of
the District's road widening activity in 1996, which was the only activity undertaken by the
District since 1974 that did result in the straightening of any cunre in the area of the 3 ~ - a c r e

THRU) _AFFIDA'c'-fT OF DAN P-Ak?tX -- 3

parcel and Camps Canyon Road. Those documents that I have so marked are the "1940 aerial'"
photograph and "May 2007 Suniey." as those terns are defined in Defendants' Second Record
Supplement.
7. I have also reviewed 2 phorogaphs, Item 3jn1, photogaph $14 and Item 3(q),
photograph 511 7 attached to Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Supplement." Those photogaphs
accurately portray the location of Camps Canyon Road from 1974 to the present and, in my
opinion, from the inception of C m p s Canyon Road. No part of Camps Gariyon Road ever
followed the course of line "C" marked on p h o t o ~ a p h#14. No part of Camps Canyon road was
ever located on top of the ernb

ent shown on photogaph $1 7. Plaintiffs' allegations to the

contrary are not true.
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my howledge and belief
Dated this 24th day of February. 2009.

#"

SLrBSCRIBED AXD SMTOW TO before me this 24th day of February, 2009.
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NOTARY-PUBLIC for the State of Idaho
My c o m i s s i o n expires:
, --- +
_X
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CERTLFlCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of February. 2009,I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the follct\niing individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE W V O R S O N
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAAD
a N f , R I C K , ID.4HO 83537
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[ X] U.S. Mail
[ Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
[ ] Hand Delivery

RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

INTHE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, I
NAND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHAFU,OTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2008-180
DEFEmANTS' REPLY BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF D E F E m M S '
MOTION FOR Y-S
JUDGrnN

NORTH LATAH G O M Y IiIGHViTAY
1
DISTRICT; BOARD OF C O M S S I O m R S FOR )
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, R E C W
)
W S E N , S H E W CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN P A W , in his official capacity and )
in kis individuat capacity,

1
Defendants,

)

INTRODUCTION
The pleadings and affidavits filed by Defendants & Plaintiffs show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that, based on admissible facts, Defendants are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on all of Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants' Reply Brief will support
dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims by responding to ar,wents made in Plaintiffs' Answering Brief,

DEFEhQmPTS'

REPLY BRIEF
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supplementing the factual discussion previously set forth in Defendants' Brief and focusing on
decisive legal principles.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs have failed to set forth genuine issues of material fact or have made allegations
that are not admissible in evidence. In particular, key dispositive, undisputed, material,
admissible facts on this record include the following:

1. The District has conducted all of its activities on Camps Canyon Road, a public kghway,
established by user, within the minimum 50-foot width mandated by Idaho law.
(Plaintiffs agree that Camps Canyon Road "was originally an unrecorded prescriptive
right-of-way," see, eg., Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments and other
Motions submitted January 26,2009, and Brief, p. 33.)
2. Plaintiffs' only Tort Claim Notice was filed with the District on November 6, 2007.

3. On or about March, 2006, acting upon Mr. Wagner's application for a driveway permit in
whch Mr. Wagner certified that he uras the owner of the proposed property to be served,
District forernan Dan Payne physically inspected the access, observed that it was well
north of an old driveway that had served Mr. Wagner's property, approved the
application and issued an access permit to Wagners. Plaintiff Don Halvorson attended a
meeting of the District Comnlissioners and complained about the issuance of that permit
and asserted that the permitted access was located on Plaintiffs' property. On or about
June, 2006, Mr. Warner submitted a new access permit application, which is not of issue
in this matter, and the District revoked and disposed of the March, 2006 permit. Second
Affidavit of Dan Payne, pp. 3-5 filed February 2,2009; Second Affidavit of Dan
Carscallen, Exhibit B, filed February 2,2009.
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Plaintiffs have summarized and set forth other admissible, material facts relevant to
Plaintiffs' claims in the Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for S u m a r y Judgment at pages
4 through 12.
Plaintiffs' latest factual submittals do not set forth any genuine issues of material fact
and, in particular, the Affidavit of Ed Swmson, whose family owned Plaintiffs' property for 70
years and who was Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest in that property, does not support Plaintiffs'
disingenuous allegation that the District moved Camps Canyon Road in 1996. Plaintiffs, in an
effort to obfirscate the truth and create an issue of fact where none exists, have alleged that
'Tamps Canyon Road has moved 84+ feet to the north at its intersection with the east property
line of the 3+/-acre parcel and 50 feet to the north at its intersection with the west property line
of the 3+/-acre parcel." See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Answering Brief, p. 34. Plaintiffs base this
proposition on discrepancies between the 1911 Deed that first identifies the 3 acre H-parcel,
instrument No. 5742 1, records of Latah County, Idaho, (the "19 11 Deed") (see copy of 1911
Deed attached to Defendant's Second Record Supplement) and the Amended Record of Survey,
Instmment No. 5 13819, records of Latah County, Idaho (referenced in and attached to
Defendants' Second Record Supplement as the "May, 2007 Survey") that locates the parcel,
including its common boundary with Plaintiffs' property along the centerline of Camps Canyon
Road.
Licensed sun7eyorJ o h Dunn, who made and filed the May, 2007 survey, included a
survey note therein in which he expressly acknowledge that Camps Canyon Road has not moved,
as follows:
Camps Canyon Road (County Road), is shown with a 50 foot wide prescriptive
WW. The physical location of the road is on a side hill and appears to be stable
with little, if any, change occurring over time.

DEFEhDANTS' REPLY BRIEF
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Likewise, Larry J. Hodge, Professional Land Surveyor, having viewed aerial photos of
the area taken on or about 1940 and 2004, opines that "the location of Camps Canyon Road in
the area between Plaintiffs' real property and Wagners' real property has not changed to any
significant degree, if at all, between 1940 and 2004." Affidavit of Larry J. Hodge, filed February
2, 2009. Mr. Hodge also opines that he would have surveyed the 3+/- 1-acre parcel differently to
include the call of "699 feet, more or less along the County road." The difference of opinion as
to what constitutes an appropriate survey of Camps Canyon Road does not create a material issue
of fact in this case becmse this difference of opinion between surveyors is not relevant as to
whether the District moved Camps Canyon Road in 1996. Rather, the survey issue instructs that
just because a discrepancy exists between a deed and a survey, a reasonable inference cannot be
drawn that a road has been moved. Although both surveyors acknowledge that a survey
discrepancy exists, nonetheless both surveyors agree that Camps Canyon Road has changed
littie, "if at all," over time.
Plaintiffs themselves offer testimony through their most recent, supporting affidavits
about an old fence that had been located along their side of Camps Canyon Road that was
removed during the 1996 improvements. This evidence of Plaintiffs' directly contra&cts
Plaintiffs' proposition that Camps Canyon Road had been previously located between 84-k and
50 feet away from its pre-1396 location. Plaintiffs attempt to have it both ways and that cannot
happen. Plaintiffs should approach this Court with the candor that is required and not play
games with the truth in an effort to achieve whatever ends they seek.
In addition, this record is replete with affidavit testimony and photographs from at least
as far back as living memory and photographic records can tell and show that Camps Canyon
Road has not moved. In particular, the affidavits of Dan Payne and Orfand Ameberg,
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respectively, affirm that Camps Canyon Road follows "the same approximate centerline" now
that it did when Mr. Payne began work for the District in 1974 and when Mr. Arneberg first
traveled the road in the early 1930's." Plaintiffs have offered no admissible evidence to create
any genuine issue of fact regarding the location of Carnps Canyon Road thmugbout its history.
This record

establish that Camps Canyon Road was widened in 1996 and again in

200512006, by approximately four (4) feet on each side of the road, to improve road safety for
increased public velGcular traffic. Affidavit of Dan Payne. Although Dan Payne and Ed
Swanson do not have the same recollections regarding their discussion, if any, concerning the
District's 1996 improvements, that issue is not material because there is no recorded instrument
evidencing any gift or dedication of land for public highway purposes as required under Idaho
law. Defendants' Brief, pp. 6-7.
Dan Payne's Affidavit also sets forth specific detail regarding the dimensions of the
traveled surface of Carnps Canyon Road from 1996 to 2006 which, in the area that is the subject
of this litigation, does not now exceed 23 % feet in width at any point and averages
approximately 21 feet in width throughout. Defendants' Brief, pp. 7-8. Further, Mr. Payne
testifies that, in addition to using and maintaining the traveled surface, to properly grade and
drain a road safe for public travel, the District maintains cut slope and fill slope for ditches,
structura1 support and snow storage, and that a minimum of 50 feet is reasonably necessary for
proper maintenance of a public highway in rural Latah County. He also testifies that the entire
stretch of Camps Canyon Road used by the District for public highway purposes in the vicinity
of Plaintiffs' real property, including cut slope to fill slope, lies within a 50-foot wide right-ofway. Defendants' Brief, p. 8. For all the verbiage in Plaintiffs' filings, Plaintiffs have not set
forth facts alleging that the public's use and/or the District's activities in the area of Plaintiffs'
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real property along Camps Canyon Road exceed or have exceeded either a 50-foot overall width
or a 25-foot width from the centerline of Camps Canyon Road.

In 1997, Plaintiffs constructed a fence adjacent to the traveled surface of Camps Canyon
Road. That fence, in places, was constructed by Plaintiffs within 15 feet of the centerline of
Camps Canyon Road. Photographs No. 5,6, 10, 11 and 16 submitted with Plaintiffs' Fourth
Record Supplement show that the District has diligently avoided harm to Plaintiffs' fence that
encroaches on the public hrghway right-of-way.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs' Takings Claims Related to the District's hprovements to Camps Canyon Road Fail
Because There Has Not Been a Taking.
All of Plaintiffs' "takings claims" under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States made applicable to the states through the 14" Amendment and under Article 1,

5 14 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho fail beca~lsePlaintiffs cannot maintain an inverse
condemnation action "unless there has actually been a taking of [Plaintiffs'] property." KMST,

LLC v. Couniy ofAda, 138 Idaho 577,579-560,67 P.3d 56,59-60 (2003). The determination of
whether or not there has been a taking is a matter of law to be resolved by the trial court. Id.
The threshold step in a takings inquiry, whether in a case of a regulatory or physical
nature, "is to determine whether the PlaintiEs ever possessed the property interest they now
claim has been taken by the challenged governmental action." See Kinz v. City of New York, 68 1
N.E.2d 312,314 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Lucas v. Suuth Carolina Coastal Council, 505

U.S. 1003, 1027, 112 S.Ct. 2886,2899. The purpose of this "logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owners7estate" is to determine whether principles of the allegedly taken
property was a "stick in the bundle of property rights" acquired by the owner. (Lucas, supra,

505 U.S. at 1027, 112 S e t . at 2899). Thus it is the "objectively reasonable application" of the
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corpus juris of Idaho, constitutional, statutory and common law, when the owner acquired the
property, that defines "the rights and restrictions contained in a property owner's title." Lucas,

sup?-a,505 U.S. at 1032, n. 18, 112 S.Ct at 2902, n. 18; Kim,supra, at 3 15-316,319. In the
instant case, Plaintiffs acquired their property on or about 1996 subject to an existing public
highway established by user and the concomitant "rights and restrictions" of Idaho public
highway law.
Applying Idaho public highway law, as originally mandated and now codified in Idaho
Code $40-2302, as interpreted &om early days of statehood in the case of Mesewey v. Cullford,
14 Idaho 133,93 P. 780, 784 (1908) and as followed to this day, to the undisputed, material facts
of this case, this Court should find, conclude and determine that (i) Camps Canyon Road is a
public highway that was established "by user" on or before 1911 (being the year specific
references are made to "County road" in the 1911 Deed), and (ii) Camps Canyon Road is 50 feet
wide and centered on the line thereof as surveyed on the May, 2007 §urvey.' There are no
adsnissible facts on this record that create a genuine issue of fact that contradicts these findings,
conclusions and determinations.

Mesewey 's holdings provide established, legal authority for the District's 1996 and
2005/2006 improvement to Camps Canyon Road, which principally included widening of the
traveled surface and improving drainage in the interests of public safety. (The public has the
right "to use the whole tract as a highway, by widening the traveled part or otherwise as the
increased travel and exigencies of the public may require. ..." Id. at 784-785.) Idaho public
highway law has long held that:
1

The only, particularized evidence of the historic centerline of Camps Canyon Road is set forth in the Affidavit of
Dan Payne and that testimony shows that Carnps Canyon was widened, in pertinent part, approximately 4 feet on
each side of the road. The May, 2007 S w e y has located the present centerhe and use of that surveyed legal
description provides such certainty as the law may require. See Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302,261 P.2d 815
(1953).
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Mere non-user of a portion of the total width of a hig&way over a period of years
does not constitute an abandonment, or estop the public Erom claiming the title or
right to the use thereof.

....
Possession and use of an unused portion of a highway by an abutting owner is
not adverse to the public and c m o t ripen into a right or title by lapse of time no
matter how long continued.
.* .
Nor does such possession and use, even though by express permission of the
public authority work an estoppel against the public use.
Even in the case of a highway established by user, all portions of the highway
right of way need not be maintained and kept up at public expense.
Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335, 345, 362 P.2d 1088, 1994 (1961) [citations omitted].
It becomes evident, applying Idaho law, that Plaintiffs' "bundle of property rights" when
Plaintiffs'acquired their property on or about 1996 is subject to the rights of the public to utilize
a 50-foot wide right-of-way for public highway purposes and subject to the statutory authority of
the District to maintain and improve that public right-of-way. As a result, Plaintiffs cannot
maintain an inverse condemation claim against the District based upon the factual record before
this Court of the District's actions and policies in the discharge of the District's statutory
responsibilities in connection with Camps Canyon Road.
Although Plaintiffs argue that Ed Swanson dedicated ri&t-of-way to the District in 1996,
there is no evidence on this record of any such written dedication or deed of gift to the District,
despite that such proof is required by Idaho Code $40-230262)before the District can acquire
any such rights. ("In all cases where consent to use the right-of-way for a highway is voluntarily
given.. .aninstrument in writing conveying the right-of-way and incidents to it, signed and
acknowledged by the party making it.. .must be made, filed and recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in whch the land conveyed.. .shall be particularly described." Idaho Code
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section 40-2302(2).) There being no such evidence in this record, the only inference that can be
drawn is that no such gin or dedication occurred.
Nor have Plaintiffs have set forth any facts showing that there has been an abandonment
or extinguishment of the public's rights in Camps Canyon Road. Plaintiffs merely present
unfounded argument that any improvement, alteration or widening of Camps Canyon Road
constitutes an unlawful taking of their property. Plaintiffs have not sustained their burden to
show the public's rights in Camps Canyon Road are other than as Defendants have established
on this record. Plaintiffs' argument that Camps Canyon Road "may be informally abandoned.. ."
is unpersuasive, contrary to law and cannot be upheld. Floyd v. Bonneville County, 137 Idaho
71 8, 728,52 P.3d 863,873 (2002).
Although Plaintiffs also challenge the constihtionality of Idaho Code section 40-202(3),
that constitutional issue was decided in the recent case of Ada County District v. Total Success
Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), which held the statute "not
unconstitutional on its face." The Court acknowledged the limitations provision of Idaho Code 5
5-224 applicable to inverse condemnation actions was "four years from the accrual of the cause
of action." Id. at 369, P.3d at 332. As the establishment of Camps Canyon Road occurred at
least 70 years ago, the limitations period for any such cause of action has nm. Plaintiffs are time
barred from bringing any claim challenging the establishment of the public's rights in Camps
Canyon Road.
Plaintiffs' Taking Claims Related to the District's Issuance of the First Access Permit Fail
Because the District (i) Did Not Take Plaintiffs' Property, (ii) Did Not Intend to Appropriate
Plaintiffs' Property and fiii) Did Not Interfere Substantially, If at All, With Plaintiffs' Property
Rights.
Plaintiffs assert takings claims under the United States and State of Idaho constitutions
related to the issuance of the Wagers' first access permit and alleged damages to Plaintiffs'
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property from the Wagners' construction on or about March, 2006, of a driveway. Wagners
abandoned that initial driveway by June, 2006, and filled in the area that had been excavated.
The District did not occupy or undertake any construction activity on Plaintiffs' property and, as
a result, did not take Plaintiffs' property or trespass upon Plaintiffs property. It is the Wagners'
conduct, if any, that is actionable in regard to any damage to Plaintiffs' property.
To assert a claim against Defendants for inverse condemnation, Plaintiffs "must establish
that treatment under takings law, as opposed to tort law is appropriate under the circumstances."
Ridge Line, Inc. v. CTnitedStates, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. Ct. App. 3003). The Ridge
Line Court described the "tort-taking inquiry" as requiring consideration of "whether the effects"
the party "experienced were the predictable result of the govement's action and whether the
government's actions were sufficiently substantial to justify a taking." Id. Elaborating on this
hvo-part analysis, the Court stated:
'Inverse condernnation law is tied to and parallels, tort law.' 9 PatrickJ; Rahan
& idelvin A. Reskin, Nichols on Eminent Domain 5 34.03[1] (3d ed. 1980 &
Supp. 2002). Thus, not every "invasion" of private property resulting from
governrnent activity amounts to an appropriation. ld. The line distinguishing
potential physical takings from possible torts is drawn by a two-part inquiry.
First, a property loss cornpensable as a taking only results when the govemment
intends to invade a protected property interest or the asserted invasion is the
"direct, natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and not the incidental
or consequential injury inflicted by the action.'

...
Second, the nature and magnitude of the governrnent action rnust be considered.
Even where the effects of the government action are predictable, to constitute a
taking, an invasion must appropriate a benefit to the government at the expense
of the property owner, or at least preempt the owners' right to enjoy his property
for an extended period of time, rather than merely inflict an injury that reduces its
value.
Id. at 1355-1356.

It is apparent that the District's issuance of an access pennit (and its timely revocation),
the consequent actions by Wagners and their timely abandonment and reconstruction of the
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aborted driveway access do not pass the "takings test" in both respects. First, Dan Payne's
Affidavit details the good faith, due diligence he applied to the issuance (and timely revocation)
of that first permit. Even if Dan Payne were found to be negligent in his discharge of this duty,
which Defendants do not believe to be the case, such conduct would fall far short of the "direct,
natwcal or probable result" of what Dan Payne did in issuing the permit. Second, even if the
effects of Dan Payne's action were deemed to be predictable, the District's action did not
"appropriate a benefit to the government at the expense of the property owner or at least preempt
the owners' right to enjoy his property for an extended period of time." Id. Courts are required
to consider "whether the government's interference was substantial and frequent enough to rise
to the level of a taking.. .'[ilsolated invasions, such as one or two floodings.. ., do not make a
taking.. ., but repeated invasions of the same type have often been held to result in an involuntary
servitude." Id. (citations omitted). At most, giving Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable
inferences, the District's action merely inflicted an injury that reduced the property's value. The
District neither appropriated "a benefit to the government" nor did it preempt Plaintiffs7"right to
enjoy.. .for an extended period of time." Such conduct is not cognizable under takings taw,
rather. it may only be pursued under tort law principles. As discussed in Defendants' Brief,
Plaintiffs are barred from pursuing tort relief because of their failure to timely file a notice of tort
claim in regard to this alleged conduct.
Plaintiffs' Due Process and Equal Protections Claims Fail as a Matter of law.

A. Claims Against Individual Defendants.
1. Substantive Due Process (With Reference to Defendants' Qualified b u n i t y )
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants -heberg, Clyde, Hansen and Payne violated their
substantive due process rights related to the District's (i) policy and actions regarding the
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widening of C a p s Canyon Road and (ii) issuance of the Wagners' access permit in March,
2006. Plaintiffs bring their claims principally pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

9 1983 which provides for

civil liability for any person who. under color of state law, subjects another "to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and bylaws." 42 U.S.C. rj 1983.
Section 1983 "does not create a cause of action," rather, it provides a vehicle for courts to review
alleged violations of constitutional or statutory law. See Aardvark ChiEdcare and Learning
Center, lizc. v. Towvlship of Concord, 401 F. Supp. 2d 427,444 (East. Dist. Pa. 2005).
Plaintiffs principal contentions in this regard are that Plaintiffs' constitutionallyprotected
property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution as well as numerous Idaho statutes are being
violated by the District's widening of C a p s Canyon Road and by the District's custom and
policy in relying upon Idaho Code section 40-23 12 and the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in
Mesewey and its progeny by which the District maintains and improves public prescriptive
roadways within a SO-foot width. Plaintiffs also contend that these substantive due process
rights are also being violated by the District's issuance of the Wagners' access pennit in March,

Legal standards applicable to a tj 1983 claim are set forth as follows:

In order to prevail on a 5 1983 claim, plaintiffs must establish that: 1) a
deprivation of a constitutionally or federally secured right occurred, and 2) the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.
...
In order "to prevail on a non-legislative substantive due process claim, 'a
plaintiff must establish as a threshold matter that he has a protected property
interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections applies."'
...
Real property ownership is undisputably a property interest protected by
substantive due process.
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the owner's good fortune in not suffering injury for several years for which he had
been hlly paid cannot be the basis of a property right protected by the
Constitution, or entitle him to be paid both when the right to inflict the damage is
acquired by the public and when the damage is actually inflicted. 26 Am.Jur.2d
Eminent Domain 5 206, at 889 (1966) (emphasis added). Because it is clear that
the Reisenauers' predecessors in interest were paid just compensation for the
right-of-way acquired by the state in 1937, the Reisenauers cannot obtain any
additional compensation for alleged inverse condemnation.
Id. at 40, 8 13 P.2d at 379 (emphasis in original).
In the case at hand, the Plaintiffs claims fail because the improvernents and maintenance
of Camps Canyon Road occurred within the fifty foot width of the roadway. The Plaintiffs have
maintained a fence within the boundaries of the right of way, however, the location of the fence
does not create a right of occupancy within the right of way. A similar determination was
reached with regard to the placement of a building within the right of way of a road in Rich v.

Burdick, 83 Idaho 335,362 P.2d 1088 (1961).
Even in the case of a highway established by user, all portions of the highway
right of way need not be maintained and kept up at public expense. Kosnnke v
fipp. 74 Idaho 302. 261 P.2d 815, In Boise Civ v. Sinsel, supra, we held that an
abutting owner who erected and maintained a building on a portion of a public
street under a permit granted by the city council, for a period of 25 years. did not
acquire a right to such occupancy, and that the city was not estopped to cancel the
permit and require the removal of the building.
Id. at 345,362 P.3d at 1094. Because the Plaintiffs have no possessory rights to the property
within the right of way, the Highway District's use of the right of way for maintenance and
improvements to C m p s Canyon Road does not establish a taking as contemplated by the 1 4 ~ ~
Amendment. Therefore: the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this issue is granted.
In addition, the Plaintiffs claim that portions of their property were taken when the
Highway Department issued driveway permits to the Plaintiffs' neighbors, the Wagners. The
issuance of the driveway permits will be discussed in more detail below-. However, with regard
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to the taking of property, this Court finds no evidence that the driveway pemits issued by the
Highway District encompassed property beyond the borders of the right of way of Camps Canyon
Road. Therefore, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the
Plaintiffs' takings claims.

B. Resolution of Plaintiffs' constitutional claims
A large portion of the Complaint sets forth claims of violations of due process and equal

protection of law. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Highway District has statutory
authority to maintain Camps Canyon Road and make improvements to the road within the
boundaries of the fifty foot width of the road. In addition to the status of the roadway, the bulk of
the Plaintiffs' claims are based upon whether the Highway District violated the Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights by failing to give notice or hold public hearings regarding improvements to
Carr;ps Canyon Road, or the issuance of a driveway permit to the Plaintiffs' neighbors, the
Wagners.
1. Plaintiffs' procedural due process claims fail as a matter of law.
The Plaintiffs allege violation of procedural due process throughout their complaint. The
main focus of these claims are based upon the Plaintiffs' perception the Highway District failed
to provide notice or a hearing prior to maintaining the road. improving the road, or issuing
driveway permits for access to Camps Canyon Road. Procedural due process requires that notice
and an opportunitlJ to be heard be afforded to a person whose protected rights are being
adjudicated.
Procedural due process "basically requires that a person, whose protected
rights are being adjudicated. is afforded an opportunity to be heard in a timely
manner." Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967,969,703 P.2d 1342, I344
(1985). There must be notice and the opportunity to be heard must -'occur at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. . . ." Cotvan v,Bd. qfComm%s,143
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Idaho 501, 5 12, 148 P.3d 1247, 1258 (2006) (quoting ilberdeen-Springf?eld Canal
Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999)) (internal quotations
omitted).
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 371, 179 P.3d 323,

334 (2008). The Plaintiffs' claims that they were not afforded an opportunity to be heard in a
timely manner fails because the improvements and maintenance of Camps Canyon Road did not
change or alter the Plaintiffs property, or affect a protected right of the Plaintiffs. The actions fell
within the authority of the Highway District to maintain public roadways.
The Highway District is given the authority to maintain public roadways pursuant to 1.C.

The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general supervision and
jurisdiction over all highways and public rights-of-way within their highway
system, with full power to construct, maintain, repair, acquire, purchase and
improve all highways within their highway system. whether directly or by their
own a g e ~ t sand employees or by contract. Except as otherwise provided in this
chapter in respect to the highways within their highway system, a highway district
shall have all of the powers and duties that would by law be vested in the
commissioners of the county and in the district directors of highways if the
highway district had not been organized. Where any highway within the limits of
the highway district has been designated as a state highway, then the board shall
have exclusive supervision, jurisdiction and control over the designation, location.
maintenance, repair and reconstruction of it. The highway district shall have
power to manage and conduct the business and affairs of the district; establish and
post speed and other regulatory signs; make and execute all necessary contracts:
have an office and employ and appoint agents. attorneys, officers and employees
as may be required, and prescribe their duties and fix their compensation.
Highway district commissioners and their agents and employees have the right to
enter upon any lands to make a survey, and may locate the necessary works on the
line of any highways on any land ~vhichmay be deemed best for the location.

I.C. 5 40-1310(1). A due process hearing is not required every time a highway district maintains
and repairs roads within its jurisdiction. See Lu Ranching Co. v. US., 138 Idaho 606, 608, 67
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P.3d 85, 87 (2003). Without some evidence there was adjudication of the Plaintiffs' protected
rights, the Plaintiffs' procedural due process claims fail.
2.

The Plaintiffs fail to establish violation of due process rights pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment.

In addition, the Plaintiffs bring their due process claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. fj 1983
which provides for civil liability for any person who, under color of law, subjects another "to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and bylaws." 42
U.S.C. fj 1983. "Section 1983 'does not confer any substantive rights. It is a vehicle for
vindicating rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal law.' BHA Investments,
Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 176, 108 P.3d 3 15, 323 (20041, citing Bryant v. City of
Blac~oot,137 Idaho 307. 3 14, 48 P.3d 636, 633 (2002).

The application of due process was discussed in depth in Maresh v. State, Dept. of
Health ~cndWeyare ex rel. Cabaljero, 132 Idaho 22 1. 970 P.2d 14 (1998).
"To determine whether an individual's due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment have been violated. a court must engage in a two-step analysis. It
must first decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment." Only after a court finds a
liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of analysis, in which it
determines what process is due.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "[tlhe requirements of
procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interest encompassed by
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." . . .
The United States Supreme Court has noted that property interests are "created
. . . by existing rules, . . . such as state law." Id. Likewise, this Court has indicated
that "determination of whether a particular right or privilege is a property interest
is a matter of state law." Further. determining the existence of a liberty or
property interest depends on the "construction of the relevant statutes." and the
'-nature of the interest at stake." Hence. whether a property interest exists can be
determined only by an examination of the particular statute or ordinance in
question.
Id. at 226, 970 P.2d at19 (internal citations omitted).
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First, this Court must decide whether there is a property interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As the foregoing opinion indicates, C m p s Canyon Road is a public highway, fifty
feet in width. The Highway District has statutory authority to maintain public roadu-ays
pursuant to I.C. (j 40- 131O(1). The Plaintiffs have not shown that the Highway District acted
beyond the scope of its authority regarding Camps Canyon Road. Thus, there is no property
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, and no liberty interest which must be protected by
due process of law.
The Defendants' management of Camps Canyon Road has not interfered with the
Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their land, as there is no evidence that the Defendants' actions
have occurred beyond the right of way of Camps Canyon Road. The Plaintiffs have not
established a due process violation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Plaintiffs
claims fail on this isstle and the Defendan,ts' motion for summary judgment is granted.

3. The Plaintiffs have not been denied to opportunity to participate in a validation
proceeding.

A major component of the Plaintiffs' due process claims against the Defendants are based
upon the Plaintiffs' perception the Highway Department failed to hold a validation hearing
regarding the status and location of Camps Canyon Road. The Plaintiffs argue that a validation
hearing should have been held before the Highway Department widened the road or issued the
driveway permits to the Wagners.
This issue was previously addressed when the Plaintiffs filed a motion for declaratory
judgment arguing that the Defendants were required to hold proceedings to validate the public
road pursuant to I.C. (j 40-303A.Through the motion for declaratory judgment the Plaintiffs
asked this Court to require the Defendants to hold validation proceedings. This Court denied the
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motion for declaratory judgment in part because the Court could find no authority through which
it could mandate the Highway District to hold such proceedings, nor did the Court find that the
fee requirement of the statute unreasonable. See Opinion and Order on Plaint$j ' ~Lfotionfor
for Declaratory Judgment Under
Declaratory Judgment of1 C. $40-203A and PlaintifSs ' ~Wotion

I.C. tj 40-203A sets forth procedures for holding a validation hearing when certain
conditions exist. The pertinent portion of this statute states:
Any resident or property holder within a county or highway district
system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of the
federal government, may petition the board of county or highway district
commissioners, whichever shall have jurisdiction of the highway system, to
initiate public proceedings to validate a highway or public right-of-way, including
those which furnish public access to state and federal public lands and waters,
provided that the petitioner shall pay a reasonable fee as determined by the
commissioners to cover the cost of the proceedings, or the commissioners may
initiate validation proceedings on their own resolution, if any of the following
conditions exist:
(a) Ii: through omission or defect. doubt exists as to the legal
establishment or evidence of establishment of a highway or public right-of-way;
(b) If the location of the highway or public right-of-way cannot be
acc~~rately
determined due to numerous alterations of the highway or public rightof-way, a defective survey of the highway, public right-of-way or adjacent
property, or loss or destruction of the original survey of the highways or public
rights-of-way; or
(c) If the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used does not
generally
conform to the location of a highway or public right-of-way described
.on the official highway system map or in the public records.

I.C. fj40-203A(1). A validation hearing can be initiated by either a resident or property holder,
or by the commissioners of the highway district. If a resident or property owner requests such a
hearing, the statute requires that person to pay a reasonable fee to cover the costs of the
proceeding.
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The Plaintiffs continue to assert that the Highway District must hold a validation hearing
because the Plaintiffs have asserted the location Camps Canyon Road cannot be determined. See
I.C. 5 40-203A(l)(b). The Plaintiffs have not paid the reasonable fee necessary to cover the costs
of the proceeding, insisting it is the duty of the Highway District to hold such proceedings.
A plain reading of this statute establishes that the Highway District is not required to

initiate validation proceedings at the request of a resident or property holder unless the resident
or property holder pays a reasonable fee to cover the costs of the proceedings. The Highway
District commissioners may initiate validation proceedings on their own resolution, but there is
no mandate in this statute requiring such a proceeding upon the request of a resident or property
holder, unless the reasonable fee to cover the cost of the proceedings is paid by the person
malting such a request. See I.C. 5 40-203A(1). The Highway District does not violate the
Plaintiffs due process rights if the Plaintiffs fail to make a formal request to initiate validatior,
proceedings and pay the reasonable fee. It would be a different case if the Highway District
simply refused to hold a hearing after the resident or property owner paid the fee and completed
whatever paperwork was necessary to initiate the proceedings. however, there is no evidence in
the record before this Court that the Plaintiffs have formally requested a validation hearing, and
paid the fee as required by the statute. See I.C. $ 40-203A(1).
The Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Tort Claim with the Highway District, however, no
petition to validate a highway or public right of way was filed. Second ,.iffidavit ofDan
Carscallen. The Plaintiffs cannot claim violations of due process when the Plaintiffs failed to
request or initiate a validation hearing. Thus, the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendants fdil on
this issue and the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
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d. Plaintiffs' dairn related to the issuance of the Wagner's access permits are
denied.

The Defendants are not required to hold a public hearing prior to issuing a driveway

The highway district board of commissioners shall have the exclusive general
supervisory authority over all public highways, public streets and public rights-ofway under their jurisdiction, with full power to establish design standards,
establish use standards, pass resolutions and establish regulations in accordance
with the provisions of title 49, Idaho Code, and control access to said public
highways, public streets and public rights-of-way.
I.C. 3 40- 131O(8). Title 40 does create a requirement that a hearing be held in some instances;
however, controlling access to public highways through the issuance of a permit does not require
a hearing. The determination of whether due process has been adequately afforded requires the
consideration of many factors. It is not necessary for every action taken by the Highway District
to be preceded by a due process hearing.
Factors to be considered in determining the adequacy of process are the
importance of the private interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
rights given the processes at hand and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards, and the government's interest, "including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."

Lu Ranching Co. v. US., 138 Idaho 606, 608, 67 P.3d 85, 87 (2003), citing itlathews v.
Eldridge. 423 U.S. 319. 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903,47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976). The Highway District
exercised its authority to control access to the public highway, Camps Canyon Road, and issue a
driveway permit to the Wagners. The District's actions were not of the sort that required a due
process hearing. Thus: the Plaintiffs' claims on this issue are dismissed and the Defendants'
motion for suinmaiy judgment is granted.
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C . Remaining Issues
The bulk of the Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed based upon the analysis above, and the
clarification that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway that is fifty feet in width. In the
alternative, however, certain claims would also be dismissed based upon the Idaho Torts Claims
Act. An analysis of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (hereinafter "ITCA") is set forth below. Finally,
the Court will address the remaining claims within the Complaint, which are properly dismissed
pursuant to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
1. Notice of a tort claim against a state entity must be filed within 180 days from the
date the claim arose.

I.C. 5 6-905 requires that tort claims filed against the state' or an employee of the state,8
must be filed within one hundred eighty days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should
have been discovered.
All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act and all claims
against an employee of the state for any act or omission of the employee within
the course or scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with the
secretary of state within one hundred eighty (1 SO) days from the date the claim
arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.

8

I.C. $ 6-902 provides the following defmitions:
1. "State" means the state of Idaho or any office, department, agency, authority, commission,
board, institution. hospital, college, university or other instrumentality thereof.

3. "Employee" means an officer, employee, or servant of a governmental entity, including elected
or appointed officials, and persons acting on behalf of the governmental entity in any official
capacity. temporarily or permanently in the service of the governmental entity. whether with or
without compensation. but the term employee shall not mean a person or other legal entity whlle
acting in the capacity of an independent contractor under contract to the governmental entity to
which this act applies in the event of a claim.
I.C. $ 6-901(1).(4). The parties do not challenge whether the Highway District falls under the definition of
"state." nor is there any argument against the determination that the comnissioners of the Highway District
are "employees" as defined in this statute.
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I.C. 5 6-905.~The Plaintiffs filed a Tort Claim Notice on November 6, 2007. Second Affidavit
afLlnn Cctrscnllen, at 2. The Ton Claim Notice sets forth claims arising from the '-Fall of 2004

until spring of 2007.'' Second-4fjduvit of Dan Carscullen, Exhibit A, at 1-3. Within the Tort
Claim Notice the Plaintiffs informed the Highway District they would be seeking compensatory
damages for the taking and holding of private property, the value of land taken during road
widening, damages to the fence, damages to the Plaintiffs' land, and loss of enjoyment of the
land, Id, at 3-4.
Pursuant to I.C.

5 6-905, all tort claims alleged by the Plaintiffs which arose prior to May

8,2007, are dismissed.1° of he Supreme Court has consistently held that 'the filing of a notice of

The purpose of the notice requirement is set forth in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981j.
The purposes of I.C. $ 6-905 are to (1) save needless expense and litigation by providing an
opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between parties, (2) allow authorities to
conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the
state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses. See Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho
71 1: 716-17, 535 P.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1975); Jorstad v. Cifi?ofLewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 125: 456
P.2d 766, 769 (1969). finless the contract and all of the acts performed pursuant to the contract
have been completedl it would be difficult for the state to determine the nature or extent of its
liability or prepare a defense to any claim. Furthermore, if parties can present the state with a
complete and definite claim for damages arising from the continuing tort, then the state may
attempt a settlement on the basis of clearly ascertainable facts.
Id. at 401: 630 P.2d at 688.
10
The statute requires notice to be filed within 180 days of the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been
discovered. The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified the time requirement in iblitchell v. Bingham ~bfernorialHospitai.
This Court has held that "[klnowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on
inquiry is the equivalenr to knowledge of the wrongful act and will start the running of the [1 80
days]." :WcQuillen v. Ci@ of Amtnon, 113 Idaho 71 9,722,747 P.2d 74 1,744 (1957). The Court
has further held that the statutory period begins to run from the occurrence of the wrongful act
even if the full extent of damages is not known at that time. Id. Sce also Ralpizs v, Cifi?ofSpirit
Lake, 98 Idaho 225,227,560 P.2d 13 15, 13 17 (1977). In a recent case? the Court of Appeals
clarified the amount of knowledge required to begin the notice period: "The statute does not begin
running when a person fully understands the mechanism of the injury and the government's role,
but rather when he or she is aware of such facts that would cause a reasonably prudent person to
inquire furrher into the circumstances surrounding the incident." ibfailory v. Ci@ of Montpelier,
126 Idaho 446,448, 885 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ct.App.1994). The claimant in 12.falloryhad argued that
the notice period should not start running until she knew the exact cause of her injury. The Court
of Appeals held that "such an interpretation would allow a party to delay completion of an
investigation for months or even years before submitting a notice under the [ITCA]." 126 Idaho at
449, 885 P.2d at 1165.
lbfitchell v. Bmgham 1\4ernorial Hosp.? 130 Idaho 420, 423, 942 P.2d 544, 547 (1997).
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claim as required by the Act is 'a mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit, the failure of
which is fatal to a claim, no matter how legitimate."' Greenwade v. Idaho State Tux Cornrn 'n,
119 Idaho 501, 503,808 P.2d 420,422 (Ct. App. 1991); quoting Banks v. University of Idaho,
118 Idaho 607,608, 798 P.2d 452, 453 (1990); see also iMcQuillen v. City of Arnrnon, 113 Idaho

Thus, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted on the following claims:
claims for damage to the Plaintiffs' fence in 2004,2005 and 2006; claims for damages to the
Plaintiffs' real property occurring prior to May 8, 2007; claims for damages from any alleged
trespass or nuisance from 1996 through May 8, 2007 claims for failure to survey or record
surveys prior to May 8, 2007; claims the Highway District failed to keep or maintain district
records prior to May 8,2007; and claims that commissioners of the Highway District
misrepresented information prior to May 8,2007.
2. Separate claims filed against the individual commissioners are dismissed

pursuant to L.G.

5 6-904 and LC. 5 6-904B.

The Complaint alleges separate causes of action against the individual commissioners of
the Highway District. The claims against the individual commissioners are for actions which
were taken within the course and scope of the commissioners' statutory duties regarding the
Highway District. The ITCA provides exceptions to go\-emrnental liability urithin I.C. $ 6-904.
This provision is applicable to the individual commissioners in the case at hand.
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope
of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for
any claim which:

1. Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental
entity exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or
performance of a statutory or regulatory function, whether or not the statute
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or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be
abused.
I.C. 5 6-904(1). All actions taken and decisions made regarding Camps Canyon Road have been
made while the commissioners have been acting within the course and scope of their
employment. I.C. 8 6-903(e) establishes "a rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an
employee within the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of
his employment and without malice or criminal intent."
The Plaintiffs have not challenged that the actions of the commissioners were in the
course and scope of their duties as commissioners of the highway district. Further, the Plaintiffs
have not asserted that the actions made by the comissioners with regards to Camps Canyon
Road were done with malice or criminal intent. Thus. any tort claims against the individual
commissioners while acting within the course and scope of their duties as commissioners of the
Highway Department fall within this exception to Liability.
Further, I.C.

5 6-904B sets forth exceptions to governmental liability in instances where a

government employee is authorized to issue a permit.

C

A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without
gross negligence or reckless. willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6904C. Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which:

I . Arises out of the detention of any goods or merchandise by any law
enforcement officer.
...
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend. or revoke a permit. license, certificate,
approval, order or similar authorization.
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I.C. 5 6-904B(1),(3). Any tort claims arising out of the commissioners' issuance of a driveway
permit to the Plaintiffs' neighbors, the Wagners, falls within this exception to liability. In
addition, I.C. 5 6-904B(4) sets forth an exception to government liability in cases where an
inspection of property is necessary. The pertinent portion of the statute establishes an exception
when liability ''[alrises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an inadequate
inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the property of the governmental entity
performing the inspection." I.C. 5 6-904B(4). In the case at hand, Commissioner Dan Payne
stated he inspected the property where the Plaintiffs' neighbors, the Wagners, requested a
driveway permit. Second Affidavit ofDan Payne, at 3.
Based upon the relevant provisions of the ITCA, any tort claims brought against the
individual commissioners in the matter at hand fall within the exceptions to governmental
liability. Therefore, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to these claims is
granted,
3. Plaintiffs fail to establish a prima facie case on remaining claims within the

complaint.

A lengthy Complaint was filed in this matter, alleging various claims not specifically
addressed by this Court in the foregoing sections of this Opinion. The Plaintiffs fail to establish
a prima facie case on these claims, thus s u m a r y judgment is appropriate. See Garzee v.

Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 828 P.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1992).
We note, however. that the existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary
judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he will bear the burden
of proof at trial. See Jerome Thrgnvay Drug, Inc. v. Finslo~l,110 Idaho 6 15. 717
P.2d 1033 (1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 17. 322, 106 S.Ct.
2548.2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532 (1 1th
Cir.1990), cert. denied 398 U.S. 1103, 111 S.Ct. 1003, 112 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1991).
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Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a
prima facie case. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue of material
fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322-33, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-58. This rule facilitates the dismissal of
factually unsupported claims prior to trial.
Id. at 774, 828 P.2d at 337 (Ct. App. 1992).
Statements of conduct within the Complaint that do not support any cognizable claim
include: "the conduct of the defendants . . . has been deliberate, flagrant, arbitrary, and offensive
to the sense of democracy and to the sense of good government.

. . ." (Complaint, at sI1.U.); "the

lack of any agency structure and the arbitrary disregard to resolve disputes and violations, the
fomenting of neighborly disputes . . .," (Id. at $ E, E.6., P., P.2., Q.f.xiii.(a)); '-negotiating in
bad faith" (Id.): "misrepresentations of statements and legal views and rulings . . . and
questionable applications of statements . . . of standards" (Id. at

5 Q.f.xii, $ Q.f.xiii(b)); "violated

the doctrine of quasi-estoppel" (Id. at $ Q.f.xiii(c)); and -'testimony . . . flagrantly intended to
thwart any and all remedies . . ." (Id. at 5 R.(6)).
In addition. the Plaintiffs set forth three criminal provisions that the Plaintiffs have no
authority to prosecute: I.C.

5 18-7001, malicious injury to property: I.C. 5

15-7008. trespass: and

I.C. 3 18-7012, destruction of fences. Because the Plaintiffs have no authority to prosecute
criminal offenses, these claims are appropriately dismissed at summary judgment.
Finally, the Plaintiffs' claims in relation to the District's alleged failure to train and to
supervise and the claim for punitive damages fail for lack of factual assertion in support of the
clairns. The Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted on these claims.
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4. Plaintiffs' various motions in addition to the motion for summary judgment are
denied.

In addition to their motion for summary judgment, various other motions were made
within the Plaint@i' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments and Other i2fotions Submitted
January 26, 2009, and Brie$ These motions include a motion to amend the complaint, a motion

to compel discovery, motions for reconsideration, and motions for sanctions against the
Defendants.
The Plaintiffs' seek to amend the complaint to encompass any claim that conforms to the
evidence. Specifically. "Plaintiffs petition the Court for leave of the Court to make such
amendments to their Complaint as may be necessary to cause Plaintiffs' pleadings to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues and to supplement and amend damages and relief as
appropriate." Plaintfls ' itilotioizsfor Partial Summary Judgments and Other :\fotions Submitted
January 26, 2009, and BrieJ; at 23-24 (Section 1.17). The Plaintiffs' motion to amend is denied.

The request does not encompass a specific issue, and further. this Court notes the Complaint on
this matter is tivent>-seven pages long. I.R.C.P. 8(e)(l) requires pleadings to "be simple, precise,
and direct."
In addition, the Plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel discovery within their motions
for summary judgment. Plaintffi ' il.lbtionsfor Partial Summary Judgment and Other ,bfutions
SubmittedJanuary 26, 2009, and Brief, at 24 (Section 1.19). The Court denies the motion to

compel, and notes a protection order has already been issued in this matter due to Plaintiffs'
requests for discovery which have far exceeded the limitations as set forth in the rules of civil
procedure. Opinion and Order on Plaintcfs ' Lblotionsfor Summary Jzrdgrnent and Llefendants '
~ ~ ~ o t i o nProtective
jbr
Orders,for Ealargement of Time and for Attorneys ' Fees.
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The Plaintiffs seek sanctions against the Defendants and Defendants' counsel for claims
of disco~eryabuse and spoliation of evidence. See Plaintgs ' iMotionsfor Partial Sz~mmary
Judgment and Other Motions SubmittedJanuary 26, 2009, and Brieyf; at 24 (Section 1.12 and
1.18) The Court finds these motions without basis or merit, and thus, the motions are denied.
In addition, the Plaintiffs ask this Court to reconsider its previous rulings on the
Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment filed on September 19, October 6, and October
21. The motions for reconsideration are denied.

CONCLUSION
Both parties to the lawsuit have submitted motions for summary judgment. Based upon
the foregoing analysis, the Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment. and various
motions, are denied and the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

ORDER
It is hereby ordered that the Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments and Other
Motions Submitted January 26,2009, are hereby DENIED. It is further ordered that the
Defendants' Motion for Summary judgment is GRAXTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED,
DATED this _ ~ ~ h of
d May
a ~ 2009.

CAI%
B.~ERRIcK- District Judge
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Don Halvorson
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, I
D 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NORTH LATAI-t COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
TEE NORTH LATAII COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND m B E R G , RICHARD
HANSEN, S m W CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in h s individual capacity,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

1
1

Case No. CV 2008- 180
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

1
)
)
)
)

1
1
)

Defendants, through counsel, respectfully move this Court pursuant to Idaho Code sections
12-I 17 and/or 12-121 andor Rules 54(d) and 54(e) I.R.C.P. and/or Rules 26(c) and (f) and 37(a)(4)
for their costs and attorney fees incurred in this action. This motion is made upon the record of t h s
action, including Defendants' Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs and Affidavit of Ronald J.
Landeck in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs filed herewith.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A ~ T O R ~FEES
~ YAND COSTS -- I

l & i b?.

DATED t k s 2 1st day of May, 2009.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.

By:
Att&eys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 21st day of May, 2009,I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be served on the following individuals in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
12 90 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ XI U.S . Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ IFAX
[ ] Hand Delivery
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RONALD J. LAhDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow; ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, INAND FOR TKE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HAtVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NORTH LATAE-ICOUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF C O m S S I O m R S FOR
TI33 NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RTGHARD
HANSEN, S K E W CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

)
)

1

)
)

Case No. CV 2008-180
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
OF A T T O M Y FEES AND COSTS

1
1
1
)

1

)
)
)

1
1
)

Defendants, through counsel, respectfully submit this Memorandum of Attorney Fees and
Costs pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 54(e).

DEFEhBANTS' mMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES k
T
\D COSTS -- 1

I. LEGAL BASIS FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
A. Idaho Code section 12-121.
Defendants, as prevailing parties in this action, are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho
Code section 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) because Plaintiffs filed and pursued all causes of action
under their Complaint unreasonably and without legal and factual foundation. As the Court
concluded in its Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summasy Judgment and
Defendants' Motion for S m v Judgment filed May 11,2009 (the "Ordd3, the record before
this Court establishes that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway established by public use.
Despite agreeing and concurring that this public highway status existed, Plaintiffs nevertheless
pursued claims for relief that either were inconsistent with their position that Cmps Canyon Road
was a public highway established by public use or were not supported factually. Plaintiffs did not
place a reasonable comtruction on Idaho law in that they refused to accept that the North Latah
County Highway District was acting withm its legal authority when it conducted operations within
the fifty-foot width of Camps Canyon Road, and Plaintiffs failed to offer any facts that the Highway
District acted outside the width of fifty feet. Plaintiffs' unreasonable construction of Idaho public
highway law coupled with PlaintiEs\elentless and misguided insistence on legal principles that &d
not apply to the facts of this case entitles Defendants to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code
section 12-121. See Daw v. School District 91,136 Idaho 806,41 P.3d 234 (2001).
Plaintiffs pursued claims for property damage aRer failing to file a written notice of tort
claim with the Highway District as required by Idaho law. Plaintiffs also pursued relief for conduct
that does not support any cognizable claim, for criminal matters PlaintifTs have no authority to
prosecute and for claims that lacked factual assertion in support.

DEFWANTS7MEMOR41t'DUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 2

In sum, Plaintiffs pursued all claims in this matter either unreasonably or without legal basis
or without factual support.
B. Idaho Code section 12-117:

Defendants, as prevailing parties in an action involving a "taxing district," Defendant North
Latah County Highway District, shall, under Idaho Code section 12-117, receive an award of
reasonable attorney fees if the Court finds that Plaintiffs, as the parties against whom judgment has
been rendered, acted without a reasonable basis in fact

law. As asserted in section LA. above of

this M m o m d m , which assertions are incorporated herein, Plaintiffs acted without a reasonable
basis in

law gxJ fact and, under such circumstances, Idaho Code section 12-117 requires that

reasonable attorney fees be awarded to the Highway District, its employees and representatives as
prevailing parties on all issues litigated by PlaintiEs in this matter. Daw, supra.
C. Rules 26(c) and (f) and 37(a)(4) I.R.C.P.:
Defendants' First Motion for Protective Orders frled October 22,2008, requested attorney
fees for dealing with Plaintiffs' unreasonable and improper discovery requests. In its Opinion and
Order on Plaintiffs' Motions for S m a r y Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Protective Order,
For Enlargement of Time and for Attorney Fees filed December 8,2008, the Court concluded that
Defendants' discovery requests propounded had "become oppressive and an undue burden," and
granted the protective order but declined "to grant an award of attorney fees at this time."
Defendants, on several occasions, had notified Plaintiffs of their abusive discovery practices but
PlaintifEs chose to ignore the rules of discovery and disregarded those warnings. Deftadants
respectllly request, for the reasons set forth in their October 22,2008 Motion, that the Court grant

an award of attorney fees at this time.
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D. Rule 54(e)(3) I.R.C.P.:
Applying Rule 54(e)(3) I.R.C.P. factors, including requisite time, labor and skill, prevailing
charges for like work and results obtained, Defendants are entitled to the full amount of attorney
fees claimed herein.

n. LEGAL BASIS FOR AWARD OF COSTS
Defendants, as the prevailing parties are entitled as a matter of right under Rules 54(d)(l)(B)
and (C) I.R.C.P. to those costs detailed below.

JIt. AMOUNT OF ATTOIWEY FEES AND COSTS
To the best of the, Defendants' knowledge and belief, the items detailed below are correct
and the attorney fees and costs clairned are in compliance with Rule 54 I.R.C.P. and any other
applicable law.
A. Attorney Fees,
Reasonable attorney fees incurred and billed to Defendants (i) by Landeck, Westberg, Judge
& Graham, P.A., for legal services performed by attorneys in connection with this action h m

March f 2,2008, through September 30,2008, and (ii) by Ronald J. h d e c k , P.C. for legal services
performed by attorneys in connection with this action &om October 1,2008, through May 10,2008:
Attorney fees supported by Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck
filed herewitfi..

$77,382.00

Total attorney fees:

$77,382.00

B. Costs as a matter of right.

Defendants have incurred the following costs recoverable as a matter of right:
Court filing fees:
Fees for service of pleading or document:
Total costs as a matter of right:
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$64.00

C. Discretionary costs.
Defendants have incurred the following costs that were necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred that should, in the interest of justice, be assessed against Plaintiffs:
Fees charged by Hodge & Associates, h c . for professional surveying
services performed by Lasry J. Hodge, Idaho licensed
professional land surveyor, who researched Carnps Canyon Road
historical deeds and photographs and submitted an affidavit that
was a necessary and exceptional cost in order to clarify
misconceptions created by PlahtiEs in their pleadings,
documents and/or briefs as to the true location of Cmps Canyon
Road:

$1,232.50

Total discretionary costs:

$1,232.50

D. Attorney fees in regard to Defendants' First Motion for Protective Order.
The portion of the reasonable attorneys fees incurred and billed to
Defendants listed in paragraph UI.A above that is attributable to
legal services performed by attorneys in connection with
Defendants' First Motion for Protective Order and supported by
Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck filed herewith:

$6,4130.00

IV.FTJRTHER SUPPORT
This Memorandum is m e r supported by the Affidavit of Ronald J. kindeck filed
contemporaneously herewith and incorporated herein.
V. CONCLUSION

Defendants respectfully move the Court for an order awarding Defendants reasonable
attorney fees in the amount of $77,382.00, costs as a matter of right in the amount of $64.00 and
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discretionary costs in the amount of $1,232.50, all as set forth in this Memorandum and fkther
supported by the Affidavit of Ronald J. h d e c k filed herewith.
DATED this 2 1St day of May, 2009.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 2 1st day of May, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be served on the following individuals in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
C W O T T E WVORSON
1290 M N C A N RIDGE ROAD
ISEXDHCK, IDAHO 83537

[ XI U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
E IFAX
[ ] Rand Delivery

DEFENDAITS' PVIEMORAhSDtlM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 6

RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
VS.
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HfGWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
THE?NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND AFWEBERG, R I C W
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

1
)

Case No. CV 2008-180

)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDURI OF ATTORNEY
FEESANDCOSTS

1
)

)
)
)
)

1
1

STATEOFIDAI-IO )
) ss.

County of Latah
Ronald J. Landeck, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho and was so licensed at all
times relevant to this action. I was an attorney in the firm of Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham,
AFFIf)AtTI' OF RONALD J. LANDECK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' h/fEMORAPyaliM OF ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS -- 1

$.'I35

P.A. at aSl times relevant to this action through September 30,2008, and have been an attorney in
the fkm of Ronald J. Landeck, P.C. fi-om October 1,2008, to the present, representing all
Defendants in the above-entitled action (collectively "both law h s " ) .
2. Defendants, through counsel, have filed concurrently herewith a Memorandum of
Attorney Fees and Costs in this action (the 'Memorandm").
3. On Defendants' behalf, I have reviewed true and correct copies of billing statements of

both law h

s that iternize the costs and attorney fees Defendants have incurred and are entitled to

recover f?om Plaintiffs under Idaho law in connection with this action.
4. To the best of Defendants' knowledge and belief the items of costs and attorney fees set
forth in said billing statements of both law h

s are correct and the costs claimed are in compliance

with Rule 54 I.R.C.P.
5. The basis of the attorney fees claimed is as set forth in the Memorandum which is
incorporated herein for all purposes of this Affidavit as if set forth fUly herein.
6. The method of computation of the attorney fees claimed is that Defendants have been
charged or assessed by both law firms an amount for attorney fees that has been determined by
multiply-ing the hours or partial hours of legal services pdormed by an attorney at the rate per hour
for that attorney as shown on both law i511ns' said billing statements. As shown by said billing
statements, attorney Ronald J. Landeck perfomed a total of 346.1 hours of legal services at the rate
of $220 per hour for total attorney fees charged to Defendants of $76,142 and attorney James L.
Westberg performed a total of 6.2 hours of legal services at the rate of $200 per hour for total
attorney fees charged to Defendants of $1,240.
7. The amount of attorney fees and costs claimed by Defendants are as follows:
A. Attorney fees as calculated in paragraph 6 above:

$77,382.00
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Total attomey fees claimed:
B. Costs as a matter of right:

Defendants have incurred the following costs which are recoverable as a matter of right:
Court filing fees:

$14.00

Fees for service of pleading or document:

$50.00

Total costs claimed as a matter of right:

$64.00

C. Discretionary costs:
Defendants have incurred the following costs that were necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred that should, in the interest of justice, be assessed against Plaintiffs:
Fees charged by Hodge & Associates, Inc. for professional surveying
services performed by Larry J. Hodge, Idaho licensed
professional land surveyor, who researched Camps Canyon Road
historical deeds and photographs and submitted an affidavit that
was a necessary and exceptional cost in order to clarify
misconceptions created by Plaintiffs in their pleadings,
documents and/or briefs as to the true location of Camps Canyon
Road:

$1,232.50

Total discretionary costs claimed:

$1,232.50

D. Attorney fees in regard to Defendants' First Motion for Protective Order.
Ronald J. Landeck performed a total of 29.5 hours of legal services at
the rate of $220 per hour for total attorney fees of $6,490.00 in
connection with Defendants' First Motion for Protective Orda,
That portion of the reasonable attorneys fees incurred and billed
to Defendants listed in paragraph 6 above attPibutable to legal
services performed by attorneys in connection with Defendants'
First Motion for Protective Order:

$6,490.00

Total attorney fees claimed in regard to Defendants' First Motion for
Protective Order:

$6,490.00

8. 1 hold the opinion that the costs and attomey fees set forth in this Affidavit were

reasonable and necessary to securejudgment in favor of Defendants.
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9. The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DATED this 21Stday of May, 2009.

SUBSCRIf3ED AND SWORN to before me this 21Stday of May, 2009.

N o w Public for Idaho
My commission expires:

k- / 7

f ilsj

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2 1st day of May, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be served on the following individuals in the manner indicated below:
DON WALVORSON
CRARLOTTE IlALVORSON
1290 AMEMCAN REDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, TC>AWO83537

[ X] U.S. Mail
[ 1 Federal Express Standard Overnight Mad
[ IFAX
[ ] Rand Delivery
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1496,

Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

Tr\i THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife))

Case No. CV 2008- 180

Plaintiffs

)

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

)

TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS'

North Latah County Highway District: Board s f

)

IMOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Commissioners for the North Latah County

)

AND COSTS AND PLAINTIFFS'

Highway District, Orland Arneberg. Richard

)

AXS WERING BRIEF TO

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities:

)

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

1

Individual Capacity

1

VS.

Defendants
Plaintiffs move this Court to strike and/or to deny Defendants' hbtion for Attorney Fees
and Costs pursuant to the following:

8 12 117;
(ii) Gnder I.C. 5 12 121.
(i) Under I.C.

(iii) Rules 54 (d) and 54 (e) I.R.C.P.:
(iv) Rules 26 (c) and ( f j and 37 (a)i4);
PLAINTIFFS h1OTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A'TTORNEY FEES
ANDCOSTS AND PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS'MOTION FOR
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1t13;

For the following reasons:
(i) As the Court has made no findings or conclusions that Plaintiffs' actions were in any
way frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation (see Stout v. Key Training, 144 Idaho 195,
158 P.3d 971 (2007)("Key Training argues it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
I.C. § 12-121. That statute allows an award of 'reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
. . .' I.C. 5 12-121. Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party only if 'the Court

determines that the action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation.') Baker v. Sz~ZZivan,132 Idaho 746, 75 1,979 P.2d 6 19,624 (1999)").
(ii) Plaintiffs' claim to possessory rights, an entitlement to, andior a constitutionally
protected property right in the case at hand is not frivolous, unreasonable and/or unfounded as
Plaintiffs hold the fee in the lands in dispute. Defendants claim is a claim of a prescriptive right
of way across Plaintiffs' land and as such is oniy an easement across Plaintiffs' land. whether the
Court finally rules that I.C.5 40-33 12 has eliminated Plaintiffs' possessory right to any 50 foot
and/or 25 feet from centerline strip of land the Defendants choose to align or locate Camps
Canyon Road on in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM or not and/or that the Defendants may
realign and/or alter the location of the easement anywhere in the SENE Section 15 T39N
R3WBM without the need for due process, equal treatment of the law and/or a rational basis for
doing so or not.
(iii) History of this case shows Plaintiffs' actions to not be frivolous. unreasonable, or
unfounded, and that Plaintiffs pursued all claims in this matter either reasonably 01- with legal basis or
with factual support. This legal action began as Defendants stated that the only way Plaintiffs would
receive a hearing on these matters was for Plaintiffs to pay a $750 fee or get a lawler. The paying of
the fee would have been futile as the Defendants had already been given sufficient evidence to
validate the road under their own resolution and the invasions of the land had already begun and were
.
(Plaintiff deprived of the
thus ripe (see Harris v. County of Riverside 904 F.2d 497 (9th~ i r1990)
commercial use of his property required to pay a substantial fee to regain that use or prompt
county to issue a final decision has been deprived of his property without due process.)
PLANTIFFS LVIOTIONTO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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Plaintiffs' first motion was for a statutorily permitted declaratory ruling for Defendants
failing to respond to Plaintiffs' filing of Requests for Regulatory Takings analysis, a simple request
of an evaluation of the impact of an administrative action of a local governmental agency on private
property owners. the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs' purpose in filing the requests was to establish a
review of the NLCHD's actions/failures to act which resulted in an alleged takins of Plaintiffs'
property without due process of law.
Likewise Plaintiffs served Defendants with requests for admissions and interrogatories then
to answer the same question--on what authority do Defendants base the actionsifailures to act in
what Plaintiffs consider to be invasions and occupations of their land? The Defendants' defense of
not filing a responseis to the IRTA requests was that "no final decision" had been made by the
Defendants. Defendants in initial response to Plaintiffs' requests for admissions and interrogatories
evaded andlor ins~~fficiently
answered the initial as well as what turned out to be the ultimate
question as to the clarification of their authority-I.C.

ij 40-23 12 mandates a 50 width of a public

right of way regardless of the determination of the circumstances peculiar to Camps Canyon Road in
the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM, regardless that the road had an uncontroverted history. as
recorded by Defendants' requests for admission and interrogatory responses, of alteration and/or no
recordation, and/or regardless of the disputed facts of the limitation of the original roadway by the
previous owners fence, of the lack of user invasion of the land as signified by the presence of large
old growth trees, of the disputed fact of the permission granted by the previous owner for the prior
alterations, of the lack of agreement of the recorded deed with the survey conducted by Rimrock
Collsultants showing the intersection points of the east and west property lines with Camps Canyon
Road to have changed from 50 to 80 feet. and despite the Idaho State Supreme Court holdings in

itieservej~v. Gullifo~d,93 P 780.780-781 ("1 I.. .and the width of roads or highways established
by prescription or public use must be determined by the facts and circumstances peculiar to the
case, and is presumed to be 50 feet in width. unless the facts and circumstarlces of the case
clearly indicate that the owner, over whose land the road runs, has limited the width of said road
to less than 50 feet prior to the time the road became a highway by user.") and ("2.. .The
provisions.. .for making encroachments upon public highurays,. . .does not apply to highways
PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' IMOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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established by prescription or user before such highways have been recorded as provided by
law.") and despite the Chairman of the Commissioners admitting that he had no knowledge of
any recordation of the road in question and the only knowledge of the establishment of the road
he had was that the road was altered in 1996.
Plaintiffs' alleged violations were of per se violations-they

were final decisions when they

occurred and were ongoing and of imminent recurrence and irreparable harm if factually found to be
true. (An otherwise valid exercise of the police power constitutes a taking for which
compensation is due if the owner suffers a permanent. physical occupation of the property. Yee v
Escondido, 112 S . Ct. 1522 (1992): Lztcas

V.

South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S . Ct. 2886,

2900 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter ibfanhattan CATV Corp , 458 U.S. 41 9, 427-28 (1982);
Purnpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1 871); Ferguson, 852 P.2d at 207. Physical

invasions have been found where the government interferes with the owner's "right to exclude."
See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v UnitedStates, 443 U.S. 164 (1979) (public access to pond); iliollan v.
California CouL~tal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (public easement to beach); Loretto, 458 U.S.

at 427-28 (installation of cable): Pumpelly, 88 U S . at 166 (flooding); Hawkins v. City ofLa
Grande, 843 P.2d 400 (Or. 1992) (one-time flooding). PFilliamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, at 186 (final decision). at 195-196 (due process

may be violated regardless of the post deprivation remedy). Sinaloa Lake Owners Association,
et al. v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398 (9"' Cir. 1989) (a physical taking is a final decision,

ana thereby satisfies Pti'iliumson Counp's first ctxhaustio:~requirelnenil: an dpprlipriate point for
determining the adequacy of the state compensation procedures is at the time of the alleged
taking occurs, see Williatnson;the rationale for requiring exhaustion of state compensation
remedies in taking cases does not extend to a claim that plaintiffs were denied due process). The
Court ruled that the matters could be determined in the present civil case with the caveat that the
matters would be considered there.
Plaintiffs' then brought forth a second motion for declaratory ruling under I.C. § 40-203a, as
for all intents and purposes, permissive steps for review of the doubts of the legal establishment
PLAINTIFFS IvfOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' IMOTION FOR ATTOIITU'EY FEES
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1

3

~

of the segment of the road in question had been fulfilled for the Commissioners to validate the
road under their own resolution and answer the elusive question-as

to what is the basis of the

Defendants' authority to allegedly invade and occupy and/or allow third parties to invade and/ or
occupy Plaintiffs' land?
At any time Defendants could have easily stated whether through I.C. $ 40-203a or under the
IRTA, responses to Plaintiffs' requests for admissions, or Plaintiffs' Interrogatories that in their
interpretation of I.C. $ 40-23 12 a 50 foot width and/or 25 feet from centerline is mandated and/or
statutorily determined and that statute allows for the alterations in the road in question without
any required civil procedures and/or response to Plaintiffs' inquiries into the disputed lands
considering the history of the road. We would simply be at the same place we are at now one
yezr !ater. It was not w~essofiabieof the Plaintiffs to proceed with further discovery and
requests for partial summary judgment based on one of two theories-either the right of way has
been statutorily determined and authorized Defendants' actions/failures to act of invasions of
Plaintiffs' land, as a matter of law, or that the right of way has been or needs to be factually
determined.
In a series of ;Motions for partial summary judgments brouglit forth by Plaintiffs stating that
the Defendants, and to which Defendants' agreed in theory, were statutorily determining the
width of the right of way and as a matter of law requested the Court to rule on the Defendants'
interpretation of the statutes concerning. The Court ruled that the right of way need to be
factually determined. It would then not be unreasonable for the PiaintiEs to conciude that the
allegation of a per se taking that needed to be factually determined would require due process
(see Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council, 134 Idaho 65 1, 8 P.3d 646 (2000)
"The test for determining whether a local governing body sits in a quasi-judicial capacity was
expressed in Cooper v Board ofCoun& Commissione~sof Ada Co-tinty, 101 Idaho 407,614 P.2d

947 (1980). In that case, this Court stated: Basically. this test involves the determination of
whether action produces a general rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of
individuals, interest (sic), or situations, or whether it entails the application of a general rule or
PLAITU-TIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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policy to specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the former determination is satisfied,
there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the action is judicial. Id. at 941,
614. P.2d at 950 (quoting Fasano v. Board of County Cornrn 'rs, 507 P.2d 23,27 (Or. 1973)).
Since S-Sixteen's appeal of the Commission's decision to deny the certificate of appropriateness
required the City Council to apply a general rule to specific parties and interests, the City
Council was sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity.") Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042,
55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) ("...right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense it does not
depend upon the merits of a claimants' assertion.. ."). ~WcCullochv. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47 (st"
?
.

Cir. 1980) (Mayor authorized malicious intrusion into disputed land without due process to
plaintiffs). Evers v. The County ofCusfer, 745 F.2d 1196 (9" Cir. 1984) (County was not
immune from 42 USC 1983 suit in declaring road to be public without giving property owner
due process.) Fuentes v Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (Due process due plaintiffs over disputed
chattels). Harris v. Coun@ ofRiverside 904 F.2d 497 (9thCir. 1990) (Plaintiff deprived of the
commercial use of his property required to pay a substantial fee to regain that use or prompt
county to issue a final decision has been deprived of his property without due process).
As corollaries to the reasonable inquiry that a factual determination of the width of the
easement would require due process, the questions of substantive due process, equal protection
of the law. a rational basis for Defendants actionsifailures to act. findings and/or conclusions.
whether due process was afforded Plaintiffs' predecessor in the land. and/or the presence of
substantial evidence in the agency record to support Defendants concl';sions and findings wouid
also reasonably arise, as Defendants' responses to these questions were that none of these were
necessary.
Plaintiffs' most recent motions for partial summary judgments on these matters are not then
unreasonable. The Defendants have admitted to widening the road and subsequent intrusions
into Plaintiffs' buffer and resultant injuries to Plaintiffs fence and the issuance, continuation of
and not revoking the first Wagner driveway access permit when Plaintiffs gave them fair
warning that they were operating out of their authority, the Defendants make no claim that these
PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDAXTS' MOTION FOR ATTOIIIEY FEES
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actionsJfailures to act were "not unauthorized", the Plaintiffs' hold the fee in the land, the
invasions of the disputed lands Plaintiffs allege are of less than a five year duration, and the
disputes to which Plaintiffs sought answers were plausible and needed to be clarified. Under
such circumstances, Plaintiffs' actions are reasonable and bringing action under 42 USC 1983,
1988 is a legitimate and a reasonable manner in which to proceed;
(iv) Attorney Fees to a prevailing defendant under 42 IJSC 1983,1988 are allowed only upon
a finding that the plaintiffs' action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation (see 42

GSC 1983; see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E. 0.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421-422 (1 978);
i'.

(v) Defendants have not shown that their fees and costs are reasonable (see Lettunich v.

Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 185 P.3d 258 (2008)"The trial court must consider all of the factors
listed in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 855, 934 P.2d 20,28 (1997). Although
some of the information may come from the court's own knowledge and experience and some may
come from the record in the case, some can only be supplied by the party. Sun Valley Potato
Growcrs, l i ~ cv Texas ReJinery Corp , 139 Idaho at 769. 86 P.3d at 483. It is incumbent upon the
party seeking the fees to provide the necessary inf-br~nation.Id.").
Defendants' counsel in his ex parte motion for enlargement of time indicated that he was
informed and knowledgeable of the case indicating he knew the basis for Defendants' claims.
Defendants' counsel does not indicate how the enormous amount of time was spent, as he did not
have to research what he supposedly already knew. Many of Defendants' filings were done for
Defendants' counsel to obtain time off or delay hearing 'or vacations. medical reasons, andlor the
moving of his office. Furthermore the Court history of this case shows the Plaintiffs' questions could
have easily been answered the very first day in Court and that the issues were protracted by
Defendants evasiveness on what it was that they basing there authority, as in "no final decision" has
been made.
"To properly exercise its discretion on a request for attorney fees. a trial court must, at a
minimum, consider the twelve factors outlined in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Boel v Stewart Tltle Guar Co .
137 Idaho 9, 16,43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002): Bldg Concepts, L t d , 114 Idaho at 645.759 P.2d at 936:

Nalerz v fenkzns, 1 13 Idaho 79. 8 1, 73 1 P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1987). These factors are:
PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
ANDCOSTS AND PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS'LMOTION FOR
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(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perforin the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the
attorney in the particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of tile professional relationsiiip with the client.
(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the
court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). The trial court is required to consider the existence and applicability of each factor
%

without placing undue weight or emphasis upon any one element. Nalen, 113 Idaho at 81, 741 P.2d at
368. The trial court need not specifically address all of the factors in writing, so long as the record
clearly indicates that all of them were considered. Boel, 137 Idaho at 16, 43 P.3d at 775; Brinkman,
115 Idaho at 351. 766 P.2d at 1232. It is incumbent upon the appellant to demonstrate that the court
failed to consider or apply the appropriate criteria. h i n Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122
Idaho 270,277,833 P.2d 128, 135 (Ct. App. 1992)" Medical Recovery Services, LLC, v. Jones,
__Idaho__(Crt

App Opinion # 83 2007)

(vi) Plaintiffs' action served a public purpose and has legal merit both in the facts of the case
and foundation in the law. I.C. $ 40-23 12 contains the word shall yet offers exception to a 50
foot right of way and even uses the word discretion in antithesis to the notion of a mandated 50
foot right of way. Furthermore; no mentioil of a 25 foot right of way is made. The holdings of
:I.feservey as stated above are contrary to the Defendants' interpretation of the law. The
Defendants interpretation of the statute denies Idaho's requirement of adverse use with out the
permission of the owner of a prescriptive right of way, the 5fhand 1 4 Amendments
~ ~
to the U.S.
constitution and numerous Idaho criminal statutes (Plaintiffs made no criminal allegations and
only brought forth these statutes to indicate that Idaho has laws against their actions which their
interpretation of I.C.

6 40-23 12 permits).
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Idaho law allows for the establishment of a highway by user, under the fulfillment of five
elements, 1) open and notorious; 2) continuous and uninterrupted; 3) adverse and under a claim
of right; 4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement 5 ) for ;he
statutory period (see f-iodgins v. Sales; 1 39 Idaho 225 (2003).
Adverse use, also referred to as hostile use or use under a claim of right are synonymotss and
are characterized as an actual invasion or infringement made without permission of the owner
(see Hodgins v. Soles, 139 Idaho 225 (2003); see also Cox v. Cox 84 Idaho 513, 514 (1962) ("10.
Highways 7(1) To establish prescriptive right in roadway, use of it must constitute some actual
invasion or infringement of the rights of the owner.)" Since the alleged invasions of the
Plaintiffs' land by the Defendants are new-less

i-

than five years of duration and therefore not yet

part of the highway (see I.C. 5 40-202) and are per se takings. as alleged, and/or infringement of
the Plaintiffs' property rights by Defendants without due process and/or equal protection of the
lam is prohibited by the Constit~~tions
of the U.S. and the State of Idaho, Idaho provides
statutorily for the Defendants to legally establish public rights. The uncontroverted evidence of
this case shows that centerline and width of Camps Canyon Road were altered in 1996 and that
old growth trees were excavated by the necessity of the straightening, realignment and widening
of the pertinent part of the road. Factual dispute exists as to whether these alterations were done
with permission of the previous owner andlor were significant in the taking of private property
whether the taking was a gift or not. Furthermore, this Court ruled that the width of the easement
needed to be factually determined.
(vii) Rules 26 (c) and (f) and 37(a)(l) I.R.C.P.: As Defendants' counsel has stated the court
declined to award attorney fees on Defendants' motion and Plaintiffs have not violated the
Court's Order. Furthermore Defendants bring forth no new information on the subject.
Plaintiffs respectfully petition Court to strike and/or summarily deny Defendants motion for
attorney fees and costs as Plaintiffs' actions were not frivolous, unfounded, or unreasonable.
On this 1" Day of June. 2009
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Don Halvorson
PLL41T\ITIFFSMOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
ANDCOSTS AND PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS'MOTION FOR
ATT0R;UEY FEES AND COSTS
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document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

GR4HAM, P.A.
4 14 S. Jefferson
P.O.
Box 9344
I
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CARL B. KERRICK
DISTRICT JUDGE

FAX (208) 883-4593
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Don Halvorson
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
v.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHSIIIZY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH
LATAI-I COUNTY I-IIGI-IWAY DJ'STRICT;
ORLAND AKXEBERG. RICHARD
HANSEW. SHERMAN CLYDE, in their
2i'ficial capacities and in their individual
capacities; DAN P A W E , in his official
capacity and in his individual capacity,

1
1
1

Defendants and Responde~lts

1

-

.
-

Case No. CV 2008-180
NOTICE OF APPEAL

,'

)

1

,'

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED WSPONDEKTS, NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSlONERS FOR T I E NORTH ZA'TAH COUNTY
HIGHWAY DISTRICT; ORLAND ARNEBERG,RICHARD HANSEN, SHERMAN
CLYDE. in their officia: capacities and in their indibidual capacities; DAN PAYNE, in
his official capacity and in his individual capacity, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEY.
RONALD LANDECK. Attorney at law, 693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9, MoscoG. Idaho
83843, AND THE CLERK OF TIIE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellants. Doc and Chzrlotie Halvorson, appeal against rhe
above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from The Order. granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgmerlr and denying Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment and Other Motioris Submitted J a n ~ a r y26.2009 entered in the aboveentitled action on the 11"' day- uf bI:iy. 2069, Hon~rabieJudge Carl Kerrick presiding.

2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and
pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) andlor 12(a) I.A.R.

3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal are as follows:
(a) Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Defendants
were operating within a legally established 50 fo425 feet from centerline right of way Qifi
when the Defendants claimed a prescriptive right of way which had never been laid out
or recorded, when the road had previously been altered with permission of the Plaintiffs'
predecessor in the land, and when the surveyed present location of the road no longer
agreed with the location of the road on the recorded deed;
(b) Whether the District Court erred in determining that the width of
prescriptive right of way is a minimum andlor a mandated 50 feet-25 feet from
centerline by statute and thus divests all Plaintiffs' possessory rights to any 50 foot strip
2lland in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM; and/or whether that the District Court
erred in not determining that the width of a prescriptive right of way must be determined
by the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case and is presumed to be fifty feet unless
the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the owner has limited the width to
less than fifty feet prior to the time the road became a highway by user; and/or whether
that the District Court erred in determining that the Defendants were not required to give
Plaintiffs due process andior equal protection of the law in the matter of determining the
width of the easement and/or right of way:
(c) Whether in cross sumrnaly judgments the District Court erred in
determining that the DefendantsiRespondents were not required to provide
PlaintiffsIAppellants due process procedural and substantive andlor equal protection of
the law on the issues of widening Camps Canyon Road. invading Plaintiffs' buffer, injury
to Plaintiffs' fence andior issuing, continuing andlor not revoking the first Wagner
driveway access permit when PlaintiffsIAppellants had given DefendantslRespondents
fair warning that the first Wagner driveway access was wholly on Plaintiffs' land and that
the Defendants were operating out of their authorized right of way:
(d) whether the District Court erred in determining that the
Defendants/Respondents were not required to provide due process to Plaintiffs in the
question of Plaintiffs' fence encroaching on the right of way when the Defendants' claim
was to an unrecorded prescriptive right of way andlor when destruction of the fence is
unlasn,ful;
(e) Whether the District Gout erred in determining that the
DefendantsIRespondents had a rational basis for their conclusions and findings regarding
Plaintiffs" and Plaintiffs' situation ii? regards to Camps Cznyon Road as it traverses the
SENE Section 15 T39N 3WBhI andlor that public rights of use, location, width, nature of
easement. amongst others had been legally established or adjudicated as
Defendants/Respondents claim was to an unrecorded prescriptive right of way and/or
whether the District Court erred in determining that the Defendants'/Respondents'
actions and/or failures to act were not arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants
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discretion and/or illegal andlor that the DefendantslRespondents had not violated
Plaintiffs' substantive due process andlor equal protection rights;
(0Whether the District Court erred in not determining that the Defendants
had the burden of proof to show andlor they had not sustained their burden of proof that
they had established the rights they claimed, to a prescriptive right of way to a 50 foot25 feet from centerline right of way, to widen Camps Canyon Road in the pertinent part,
andlor to permit the Wagners to cross property lines andlor to permit the Wagners to
traverse Plaintiffs' land to get to the permitted driveway access;
(g) Whether the District Court erred in its determination that the
E'laintiffslAppellants did not have a protected property right as they had the fee in all the
lands in dispute andlor that the Defendants'IRespondents' actionslfailures did not alter
Plaintiffs'IAppellants' property rights andlor that I. C. 8 40-23 12 had divested Plaintiffs
of all property rights in any 50 foot strip of land in SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM;
(h) Whether the District Court erred in its determination that the Plaintiffs
were not denied an opportunity to participate in a validation proceeding and/or that that
Plaintiffs' motion for declaratory judgment under I. C. 5 40-203a was advisory in nature
when Defendants failure to initiate validation proceedings under the Commissioners
resolution was an application of the law andlor whether the District Court erred in its
denying Plaintiffs a Declaratory ruling under I.C. 5 67-8003(3) which basically presented
the same set of facts and theories of law that the cross summary judgment did;
(i) Whether the District Court erred in its determination that a tort claim
notice was applicable in this case andlor whether if it was applicable that it was not
timely sent;
(j) Whether the District Court erred in its determination that Plaintiffs'
complaints of Defendants'/Respondents'iizvidious conduct, bias toward the Wagners,
vindictive actionslfailures to act, deliberate indifference andlor callous disregard to
Plaintiffs' constitutional rights andlor liberties andlor Defendants' failure to properly
train its employees in the obvious need to do so do not support any cognizable claim:
(k) Whether the District Court erred in its determination to deny Plaintiffs
an opportunity to amend their complaint for continued irreparable harm of repeated
darnage to Plaintiffs' fence and further encroachment of Plaintiffs' buffer since
Plaintiffs" filing of the Complaint;
(1) Whether the District Court ened in its determination to deny Plaintiffs'
discovery and/or spoliation motions andlor motion for sufficiency of Defendants'
answers in as PlaintiffsIAppellants stated that Defendants/Respondents have continually
changed their stories, offered affidavits in bad faith asserting records which they either
have not produced and/or are not existent in regards to the establishment of the
public/Plaintiffs' rights of the easement which traverses Plaintiffs' land;
(m) Whether the District Court ened in determining that Plaintiffs' 42
USC 1983-1988 claim u a s not actionable as Plaintiffs had fee in the lands in dispute, the
disputed lands had not been used for a period of five years and the Defendants had
admitted that they had not provided Plaintiffs with any hearing, pre or post claim of
Plaintiffs alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights andlor liberties;
(n) Whether the District Court ened in not considering the District Court's
unconstitutional ruling that I.C. 5 40-23 12 eliminates all Plaintiffs' possessory rights to
any 50-25 feet fi-om centerline in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM without due
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process and/or equal protection of the law and/or that I.C. $ 40-23 12 is unconstitutional
as interpreted by the Defendants to mandate a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of
way andor that I.C. 5 40-23 12 is unconstitutional on its face as it mandates an
unrecorded prescriptive right of way to be 50 feet-25 feet from centerline and is a
taking without due process and/or equal protection of the law and/or without just
compensation and/or not for public use;
(o) Appellants come forth before the Idaho State Supreme Court to
petition Court to enjoin the District Court fiom granting Respondents summary judgment,
and denying Appellants declaratory relief from the irreparable harm of the abuse of, the
deliberate indifference to and the callous disregard for the Appellants' constitutional
rights.
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? If so, what
portion? To Appellants' knowledge no order has been issued sealing any portion of the
record of this case.
5.(a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes, a reporter's transcript is requested.
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the
reporter's transcript. Transcripts of all pretrial proceedings, including:
(i) Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Defendants' biotion to Enlarge Time
heard on April 15,2008;
(ii) Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 40-203a heard on
May 13, 2008;
(iii) Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment under I.C. 67-8003 (3)
heard on May 27,2008;
(iv) Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Declaratory Judgments
under I.C. 40-203a and I.C. 67-8003(3) heard on August 26,2008:
(v) Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments dated September
19. October 6, and October 2 1,2008 and Defendants' Motion for Protective Orders heard
on November 18,2005;
(vi) Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments and Other
Motions submitted January 26.2009 and Defendants' iMotion for Summary Judgment
heard on March 3.2009.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
(i) Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.5 67-8003(3);
(ii) Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory
Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003(3);
(iii) Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment of I.C. $ 40-302a;
(iv) Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory
Judgment of I.C. 5 40-302a;
(v) Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory
Judgment of I.C. 5 40-302a;

(vi) Plaintiffs' Reply To Defendants' Objection To Plaintiffs' Motion For
Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.$ 67-8003(3) And Brief;
(vii) Plaintiffs' MotionlBrief To Reconsider Court's Opinion and Order
on Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 8 40-302a and Plaintiffs' Motion
For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.5 67-8003(3);
(viii) Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment/Adjudication of
the Issue Of The Nullification Of The Original Prescriptive Right of Way And
Subsequent Burden Of Proof Of Prescription And/or Validation Of A Legally
Sstablished Right Of Way;
(ix) Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment/Adjudication of the Issue Of The Nullification Of The Original
Prescriptive Right of Way And Subsequent Burden Of Proof Of Prescription;
(x) Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary JudgmenV'Adjudicationof the
Issue Of The Facial Validity Of The NLCHD7sStanding Operating
Procedure/Policy/Custom For Widening a Prescriptive Right Of Way;
(xi) Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary JudgmentIAdjudication of the
Issue Of The Cause Of Action Under 42 USC 1983;
(xii) Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment/Adjudication of the Issue Of The Cause Of Action Under 43 USC
1983;
(xiii) Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial
Summary JudgmentlAdjudication of the Issue Of The Ca-ciseOf Action Under 42 USC
1983;
(xiv) Plaintiffs' Reply To Defendants' Answering Brief To Plaintiffs'
Motion For Partial Summary Judgments Filed September 19, October 6. and October 21,
2008, Defendants' Motion to Strike and Defendants' Motion For Attorney Fees;
(xv) Plaintiffs' Second Record Supplement in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment/,4djudication of the Issue Of The Cause Of
Action Under 42 USC 1983;
(xvi) Plaintiffs' Interrogatories and Requests For Admissions and
Defendants7Responses (PIRADR);
(xvii) Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' First Motion For Protective
Orders, For the Enlargement Of Time and for Attorney Fees and Brief;
(xviii) Plaintiffs7First Certificate of Compliance With IRCP Rule 37(a):
(xix) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike;
(xx) Ed Swanson7sFirst Affidavit;
(xxi) Ole Hanson's First Affidavit;
(xxii) Joe Yockey's First Affidavit;
(xxiii) Plaintiffs' ~MotionFor Partial Summary Judgments and Other
hfotions Submitted January 26, 2009, and Brief
(xxiv) Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment and Reply To Defendants' -4ns~reringBrief and Objection to Plaintiffs'
Motion For Partial Surnma~yJudgments and Other Motions Submitted January 26, 2009;
(xxv) Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial
Summary Judgments and Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009;
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(xxvi) Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment and Reply To Defendants' Answering Brief
and Objections to Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Summary Judgments and Other Motions
Submitted January 26,2009;
(xxvii) Plaintiffs' Third Record S~~pplement;
(xxviii) Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Supplement;
(xxix) Affidavit of Dan Payne in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions For
Partial Summary Judgments Filed September 19, October 6, and October 2 1,2008;
(xxx) Second Affidavit of ?an Payne;
(xxxi) Third Affidavit of Dan Payne;
(xxxii) Affidavit of Orland Arneberg in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions
For Partial Summary Judgments Filed September 19, October 6; and October 21, 2008;
(xxxiii) Affidavit of Dan Carscallen in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions
For Partial Summary Judgments Filed September 19, October 6, and October 2 1, 2008;
(xxxiv) Defendants' Reply In support of Defendants' Motion For
Summary Judgment;
(xxxv) Defendants' Second Record Supplement in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment;
(xxxvi) Defendants' Answering Brief to Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial
Summary Judgments Filed September 19, October 6, and October 21,2008, Defendants'
Motion To Strike and Defendants' Motion For Attorney Fees.
7. I certify:
(a) [x] That a copy of this notice of appeal has been sewed on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Nez Perce County Court Reporter Nancy Towler, District Court of
the Second Judicial Court for the State of Idaho in and for the County of Nez Perce,
Lewiston, Idaho; 235 Larkspur, Lewiston, Idaho, 83501.
(b) (1) [x] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c) (1) [x ] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has
been paid.
In the alternative Appellants state that they have been to Lewiston (Nez Perce
County Courthouse) and have made several calls to the same to obtain an estimate of this
cost and have been told that this is a Latah County Case and that Latah County Court
needs to make the estimate. Likewise Appellants have been to Moscow (the Latah
County Courthouse) and have made several calls to the same to obtain an estimate of
these costs and have been told that the Nez Perce County Court has the records and
therefore they need to make the estimate. As of this filing Nez Perce County Court says
they will send the record back to Latah County and Latah County says they haven't got
the records. Appellants have offered to pay Latah County in excess of $1000 to cover the
duplication costs andlor whatever amount this would take so that Appellants could certify
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the estimate had been paid however that the sum has to be paid to those who make the
estimate.
(d) (1) [ x] That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) [x] That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20 (and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to 5 67-1401(1), Idaho Code).
DATED THIS

/

7

day of June, 20 @,

Q&

/$L$l&*W-

Don Halvorson
PlaintiffiAppellant Pro se
(When certification is made by a party instead of the party's attorney the following
affidavit must be executed pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 17(i))
R

State of Idaho

1

County of

1

) ss.
L.4

K:

Don Halvorson , being sworn, deposes and says:
That the party is the appellant in the above-entitled appeal, and that all statements
in this notice of appeal are true and
and belief.

Signature of Appellant
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this
(SEAL)

I

zt7

day of June, 2 0 e .
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SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
BE IT KNOUW, THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS W E E HAD. TO-'CVIT:
COURTROOM #1
9 1149 Don and Charlotte Halvorson present.
Ronald Landeck present.
91222 i%r. Landeck presents argument re: motion for attorney fees and costs.
91 808 Mr. Halvorson presents argument re: motion for attorney fees and costs.
93041 Mr. Landeck presents rebuttal argument.
93502 Court takes matter under advisement and will issue a written decision.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

1
DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON,
(Husband and Wife)

)

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. CV 2008-001 80

v.
OPINION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

NORTH LARAH COUNTY HIGHWAY )
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
1
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)
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, )
ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
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HANSEN, S H E M A N CLYDE, in their
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1
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official
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capacity and in his individual capacity,
Defendants.
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This matter came before the Cowt on the Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and
Costs. The Court heard oral argument on June 23,2009. The Plaintiffs proceededpro se in the
matter, and Mr. Halvorson presented argument. The Defendants were represented by Ronald
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Landeck, of the firm Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham. The Court, having heard argument
and being fully advised in these matters, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND

A comprehensive background of this matter is located within the Opinion and Order on
Plaintiffs' Motionsfor Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants ' Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed on May 11,2009 (hereinafter "May 1I, 2009 Opinion and Order"). At that time,
this Court denied the Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment, as well as other various
motions contained within the Plaintiffs' filings. The Court also granted summary judgment in
favor of the Defendants and summarily dismissed all causes of action found in the Complaint. ,
Following the grant of summary judgment, the Defendants filed a motion for attorney fees and
costs, seeking recovery for costs and attorney's fees incurred defending the underlying civil
action.

ANALYSIS
The Defendants are seeking an award of attorney's fees and costs associated with
defending the underlying civil action. The Defendants argue they are the prevailing party on the
matter, and as such, attorney's fees and costs should be granted in their favor.
1. Prevailing party
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine which party is the
prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney's fees. Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353,
359, 179 P.3d 3 16,322 (2008), citing Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,484, 129 P.3d 1223,
1233 (2006). I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) sets forth criteria to guide the Court in making such a
determination.
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In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). In conjunction with this rule, the Court is guided by three principal factors:
[Tlhere are three principal factors a trial court must consider when determining
which party, if any, prevailed: (1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation
to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the
parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the
claims or issues.
Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 192, 191 P.3d 1107, 11 12 (Ct. App. 2008), see also Sanders v.

a

Lanvord, 134 Idaho 322,l P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000).

In the case at hand, the Defendants are the prevailing party on all accounts. In the May
11,2009 Opinion and Order, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on
all claims filed in the Complaint, summarily dismissing the case. The Plaintiffs also filed partial
motions for summary judgment, plus various other motions, which were all summarily denied.
There were multiple claims and issues filed by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants. At s u m a r y
judgment, the Defendants prevailed on each of the claims. Thus, when considering the extent to
which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues, the Defendants prevailed in
full. Based upon I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) and the three factors set forth above, the Defendants are
the prevailing party in the matter.
2. Attorney's fees
As the prevailing party, the Defendants filed a motion seeking attorney's fees to
reimburse the Highway District for the rnoney spent defending the action. The Defendants are
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seeking attorney's fees pursuant to I.C.

5

12-121, or in the alternative, I.C. 5 12-1 17. In addition,

the Defendants have renewed their motion for attorney's fees sought when the Defendants filed
their First Motion for Protective Orders in October, 2008. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the
Court finds that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate in this matter.
a. I.C. § 12-121

I.C. tj 12-121 allows a court to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in
any civil action.
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership,
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.

3.

I.C. 5 12-121. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) narrows the scope of this statute by providing that "attorney fees
under section 12-12 1, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the
facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation.'' I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).'
In Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 5 18,20 P.3d 702
(2001), the Idaho Supreme Court provided guidance regarding awards of attorney's fees pursuant
to I.C. 5 12-121.
This Court has held that an award of attorney fees under I.C. 12-121 is not a
matter of right, and is appropriate only when the Court, in its discretion, "is left
with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Owner-Operator Ind. Drivers
Assoc. v. Idaho Public Util. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 401, 408, 871 P.2d 818, 825
(1994). When deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be
taken into account. Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees
In addition, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) does not allow a court to award attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. 5 12-121 where a case
is resolved with a default judgment.
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may not be awarded under I.C. 5 12-121 even though the losing party has asserted
factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. See
Turner v. Willis, 1 19 Idaho 1023,812 P.2d 737 (199 1). The award of attorney fees
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and the burden is on the person
disputing the award to show an abuse of discretion. See Anderson v. Ethington,
103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). In determining whether the trial court has
abused its discretion, we again turn to the three-factor test articulated in Sun
Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho at 94, 803 P.2d at
1000.

Id, at 524-525,20 P.3d at 708 - 709.
It is noted that an award of attorney's fees under I.C. 5 12-121 is not a matter of right.
This Court must take into account the entire course of the litigation. When considering the entire
course of litigation in the case at hand, this Court is left with the abiding belief that the action

th

was pursued or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. During the early stages
of the case, when the Plaintiffs were seeking declaratory judgment, the Court considered there
may potentially be a question of fact regarding the status of Camps Canyon Road as a public
right of way. However, as the litigation progressed, it became clear that there was no dispute
regarding the status of the roadway, and further, no dispute that the actions taken by the
Defendants fell well within the scope of the right of way of the road. Throughout the litigation
the Plaintiffs continued to press novel and unsupported legal arguments regarding the status of
the road. The Plaintiffs conceded the roadway was a public highway, yet pursued claims for
relief which were inconsistent with this position.
In addition to claims regarding the status of the roadway, a significant portion of the
complaint is based on clams of violations of due process and equal protection. These claims
were unsupported in fact and failed as a matter of law. Finally, the Plaintiffs set forth a myriad of
remaining issues, including tort claims, claims for criminal offenses, as well as assorted and
miscellaneous statements of conduct which did not support any cognizable claim.
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Further, the Plaintiffs unreasonable construction of highway laws and relentless and
misguided insistence on legal principles that had no application to the facts of this case became
more pronounced with continued litigation. The Plaintiffs continually filed motions to
reconsider, taking the same stance as they had taken in the original motions. In total, the
Plaintiffs pursued a relatively simple underlying case in a manner that was unreasonable, without
legal basis or factual support, and ultimately, frivolous. Taking the entire course of litigation into
account, this Court finds that an award of attorney's fees is proper under I.C. tj 12-121 and
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).

b. 1.C. $12-117
In addition to seeking attorney's fees pursuant to I.C.
award is appropriate based upon I.C.

5

5 12-121, the Defendants argue an

12-117. For purposes of a complete record, this Court

will consider whether attorney's fees are appropriate pursuant to this statute, even though the
Court has already concluded that attorney's fees should be awarded pursuant to I.C.

9

12-121.

The pertinent portion of I.C. 5 12-117 states:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
If the Court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law, an award of attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses
is permitted. See Castrigno v. ibfcQuade, 141 Idaho 93,98, 106 P.3d 419, 424 (2005). I.C. 5 12117 applies both to proceedings brought by the litigant, as well as those brought against the
litigant by a governmental entity. See Cox v. Dept. of Ins., State ofldaho, 121 Idaho 143, 823
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P.2d 177 (Ct. App. 1991). Thus, in the case at hand, the Defendants may pursue an award of
attorney's fees pursuant to this statute.
This Court notes "[tlhe purpose of I.C. 5 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or
arbitrary action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes
agencies should never have made." In re Daniel W:, 145 Idaho 677,682; 183 P.3d 765,770
(2008), see also Rincover v. State, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999). It also follows
that tax payers should not be expected to bear the burden when a litigant brings a case against a
governmental entity, such as the Highway District, where the Highway District has borne an
unfair and unjustified financial burden in defending against groundless charges made by the
Plaintiffs. The Defendants have borne significant costs in defending the action before this Court
because the Plaintiffs pursued the underlying lawsuit without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Similar to the analysis regarding I.C.

5

12-121, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs' actions

in the underlying lawsuit were without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Based upon this
conclusion, an award of attorney's fees is also appropriate pursuant to I.C. 5 12-117
c. Amount of attorney fees allowed pursuant I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)

When making an award of attorney's fees, the Court must consider the criteria set forth in
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).

(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case.
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(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I
The
) nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal
Research), if the court finds it w-as reasonably necessary in preparing a party's
case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
I.R.C.P. 53(e)(3), see also Building Concepts, Ltd. v. Pickering, 114 Idaho 640,759 P.2d 93 1
(Ct. App. 1988). Based upon these factors, this Court finds the amount of attorney's fees
requested by the Defendants is reasonable and appropriate in the case at hand.
This Court notes that the request for attorney's fees adequately reflects the time and lab;;
required to defend the action. The Complaint filed in this matter was of great length. A myriad
of issues were presented, and further, as the litigation progressed, briefing by the Plaintiffs
became very lengthy. Regarding the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented, this Court
is of the belief that the underlying issue: the status of the roadway, was not a complex legal
matter. Even so, the novelty of the issues argued by the Plaintiffs, as well as the amount of issues
set forth created difficulty in the legal analysis of the case.
Based upon a complete review of the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), as well a
consideration of the sheer volume of briefing in this matter, this Court finds that the Defendants
are entitled to the full amount of attorney's fees claimed for defending this civil action.
d. Attorney's fees for first motion for protective orders filed October 22,2008
The Defendants are also seeking an award of attorney's fees for the Defendants' first
motion for protective orders filed October 22, 2008. The Defendants requested attorney's fees
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pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c), (f) and I.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) for dealing with Plaintiffs' unreasonable and
improper discovery requests. I.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) reads in pertinent part:
If the motion is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the
party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney
advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, unless the court
finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
This Court granted the Defendant's motion for a protective order, finding that the Plaintiffs'
propounded discovery requests had become oppressive and an undue burden. Further, this Court
finds that the Plaintiffs' opposition to the motion was not substantially justified, nor were there
Ir

circumstances that make an award of expenses unjust.
The Court is well aware that the Plaintiffs have pursued the underlying civil matter on a
pro se basis; however, the rules are very clear about the methods of conducting discovery. The
amount and types of discovery requests made by the Plaintiffs were well beyond the scope
contemplated by the rules of discovery. Thus, based upon I.R.C.P. 37(a)(4), the Defendants are
entitled to reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, as requested in the Defendant's First
Motion for Protective Orders filed on October 22,2008.

3. Costs
In addition to attorney's fees, the Defendants are seeking certain costs associated with
defending the action. There are two categories of costs: costs as a matter of right and
discretionary costs.
a. Costs as a matter of right

The Defendants are seeking recovery of costs as a matter of right for the following items:
court filing fees and fees for service of pleading, in the total amount of $64.00. The prevailing
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party is entitled to recover the costs for these items pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C).
Specifically, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(l) allows for recovery of costs associated with court filing fees
and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(2) allows recovery for the costs associated with service of any pleading
or document in the action. Thus, the Defendants' motion for costs as a matter of right is granted.
b. Discretionary costs
The Defendants are also seeking an award of discretionary costs for the cost of
professional surveying services performed by Larry J. Hodge. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) sets forth the
criteria the Court must consider when determining whether an award for discretionary costs may
be granted.

c-

Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that
listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of
justice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon
objections to such discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs,
shall make express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost
should or should not be allowed. In the absence of any objection to such an item
of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own motion any such items of
discretionary costs and shall make express findings supporting such disallowance.
This Court finds that the costs associated for the services of Mr. Hodge were necessary and
exceptional costs which were reasonably incurred in the process of defending the civil action.
Mr. Hodge provided valuable testimony in his affidavit concerning historical deeds and
photographs, as well as clarifications regarding the true location of Camps Canyon Road. Thus,
the recovery of the costs of fees charged by Mr. Hodge is allowed, and the Defendant's motion
for these costs is granted.
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CONCLUSION
The Defendants are seeking the recovery of attorney's fees and costs associated with
defending the lawsuit brought by the Plaintiffs regarding issues surrounding the location of
Camps Canyon Road, in Latah County, Idaho. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the
Defendants on all issues within the Complaint filed by the Defendants. Based upon the
foregoing analysis, this Court finds that an award of attorney's fees is granted pursuant to I.C. 5
12-121, or in the alternative, based upon I.C. 5 12-117. In addition, based upon the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Defendants' request for costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs
is also granted.

P

ORDER
The Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs is hereby GRANTED. It
is further ORDERED that the Defendants' counsel prepare a judgment for the Court's review
consistent with the Court's foregoing Opinion and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

3&

2009.

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge
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RONALD J. L N E C K , ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
4 14 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, 03 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND SUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, EN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,

1
)

1
1
1

Case No. CV 2008- 180

)

JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS

VS.

NORTH L A T M COUNTY HICISWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
COMMISSLOmE FOR THE NORTH
L A T M COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT,
ORLAND -BERG,
RIGHANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their
individual capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his
official capacity and in his individual
capacity,
Defendants.

1
)
)
)
)
)

1
)

1
1

This Court having entered an Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs in this matter on August 3, 2009, and consistent therewith:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Jud,ment is entered against
Plaintiffs Don and Charlotte Halvorson, husband and wife, in favor of Defendants North Latab
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County Highway District, Board of Commissioners for the North Latah County Highway
District, Orland Arneberg, Richard Hansen, Sherman Clyde and Dan Payne, in the amount of
$78,678.50. Interest shall accrue on money due under this Judgment at the legal rate of interest
as determined under Idaho law from the date hereof.
DATED this

17 %ay

of ~ u g u s t2009.
,

District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TIEE STATE OF IDAEXO, IN AYD FOR THE CObTTY OF LATAH

DON HALVORSON,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,

)
)
)

Supreme Court Case No. 36825-2009

1

and

)

1

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGWAY )
DISTRICT, BOARD OF
)
.COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH )
LATAH COUNTY H I G W A Y
)
DISTRICT; ORLAND ARNEBERG,
)
RICHARD HANSEN, SHERMAN
)
CLYDE, in their official capacities and )
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)
PAYNE, in his official capacity and in
)
his individual capacity,
)
)
Defendants/ Resp ondents
)
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
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IN WITNESS MrI-fEREBF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court at Moscow, Idaho this

day of September, 2009.
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